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Abstract: The Irrational Supreme Court
The pejorative “irrational” is used to describe many defects in legal reasoning, but is 
generally not meant to be understood as a literal lack of rational thinking.  Similarly, the 
“rational basis test” is not meant to determine whether a legislature is “not endowed with reason 
or understanding,” but rather if it has acted with some hidden, invidious motive. Incredibly, 
though, the Supreme Court has frequently issued truly  “irrational opinions,” simply due to the 
fundamental nature of group decision-making.
Much has been written about Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility 
Theorem,” which proved that, when faced with more than two issues, group voting might result 
in “a lack of transitivity.” For example, given a choice between three beverages, group voting 
might indicate that the group prefers coffee over soda and prefers soda over tea, but also prefers 
tea over coffee. There is no principled way to determine the group preference with such a lack of 
transitivity. Despite frequent claims that this lack of transitivity affects the Supreme Court,  no 
any actual occurrences have previously been identified. In this Article, I display the first such 
example, but also show why Arrow’s theorem is not a significant cause for “irrational” Court 
opinions.
I will also analyze another, far more serious source of irrational decisions.  Specifically, 
on numerous occasions, one party received the votes of a majority of the Justices on every 
relevant issue yet lost the case anyway.  In this Article, I will prove what I term the “Irrationality 
Theorem,” the proposition that it is impossible to eliminate the possibility that the Supreme 
Court (or any other multi-member tribunal), will issue such an opinion.  I will also show that 
there are several Supreme Court cases that unmistakably embody this irrationality, and discuss 
the unfortunate consequences of such decisions.
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The Irrational Supreme Court
I.  Introduction
The pejorative “irrational” is used to describe many different defects in legal 
reasoning.  If taken literally, it is an accusation that the legislators who passed an 
irrational law or the judges who agreed to an irrational opinion were, “not endowed 
with reason or understanding,”1 or were “void of reason or understanding; as, 
‘brutes are irrational animals.’”2
When the Supreme Court strikes down a law using the “rational basis” test, 
the criticism of the legislature is neither that personal nor that extreme.3  In 
applying the requirement that a “classification drawn by the statute is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest,” the concept of “rationality” is not meant to be 
taken literally.4
In reality, the conclusion of “irrationality” reflects a wide range of possible 
disagreements. It is not uncommon, for example, for a Supreme Court Justice to 
describe as “irrational” a situation where he or she believes that two actions cause 
the same problem, but only one is prohibited.  Justice Stevens, for example,  said it 
was "simply irrational" for a state to ban partial birth abortion procedures yet 
permit other forms of abortion which were "equally gruesome".5  Similarly, Justice 
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O’Connor termed the use of different standards of proof for committing the 
mentally ill than for committing the mentally retarded “irrational.”6
Other times, Justices have used the word “irrational” to criticize decisions 
which they see as self-contradictory, such as permitting actions which cause the 
very harm sought to be prevented.  Justice Scalia found it “irrational,” that 
“seeking to harm an abortion clinic's business through persuasion is indeed 
unlawful in South Carolina,” yet a court issued an injunction that would “permit 
such harm so long as it is inflicted at a distance of 12 feet from the driveway[.]”7
Still another use of the word “irrational” is to describe situations where there 
is no reasoning at all to support a decision.  Thus, the Court has stated that 
regulation of even non-fundamental rights can violate the Due Process Clause 
when the restrictions imposed are “undeniably irrational as unsupported by any 
imaginable rationale.”8
Most people would agree that, absent some other facts, it is irrational to treat 
functionally similar cases different, or to permit the very harm you are trying to 
prevent, or to act without the slightest justification. While these principles may not 
be controversial, deciding when they have occurred will usually be contentious.  
What appears to be irrationally differential treatment to one person may well be 
viewed as a valid distinction to another.  For example, in the 1996 case, Romer v. 
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Evans,9 the Supreme Court rued that an amendment to the Colorado constitution 
which prohibited all state and local bans of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians violated the equal protection clause.  Justice Anthony Kennedy, speaking 
for the Court found that the law’s, “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but 
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.”10 By contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia argued in dissent that the law was 
indeed rational:
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If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to 
deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed 
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where 
criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual "orientation" is 
an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.11
Justices frequently disagree over whether a decision is supported by a 
legitimate rationale or not.  To term a decision “irrational” in this setting is really a 
subjective determination.  It is more of a statement that “I disagree with the 
validity of your premise” or “I disagree with your belief that a given conclusion 
follows from a particular premise.” This is far less insulting, and more likely 
accurate, than a literal charge of irrationality, which implies “No logical person 
could agree with your reasoning process.”
Perhaps the most commonly accepted example of “irrationality” would be to 
declare simultaneously that something both did and did not exist, or that a 
proposition is simultaneously true and not true.12 Nonetheless, decision-makers 
sometimes will willfully create such contradictory decisions in order to avoid the 
consequences of consistency. Consider the case of a prohibition-era jury finding  a 
defendant not guilty of unlawful possession a six particular glasses of bootleg 
liquor, but guilty of maintaining a nuisance by keeping those same six glasses of 
liquor for sale.13  According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the verdicts were 
inconsistent, but could be explained on the theory that the jury was deliberately 
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voting so as to be lenient to a defendant they believed was guilty:
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows 
that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak 
their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no 
more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to 
exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.14
The irrationality of inconsistent verdicts, then, was not a failure of logic, but 
a deliberate device to reach a desired end.  Irrespective of the judge’s instructions 
and the obvious illogic, the jury basically manipulated the system so that a guilty 
party was punished, but not too severely.  Such “illogic” can be avoided, at least 
theoretically, by special verdicts or requiring juries deciding multiple counts to 
only convict a defendant on a “compound crime” if it convicts on the predicate 
offense as well.15
Other times, irrationality occurs as the result of simple human error. The 
Supreme Court was probably guilty of this during its trilogy of cases considering 
the applicability of the First Amendment to private shopping centers.  In 1968, in  
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,16 the Court ruled that 
a union had a first amendment right to picket within a large privately owned 
shopping center.  Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court, without 
overruling Logan Valley, held that anti-war protesters did not have a first 
amendment right to distribute handbills in a private shopping center.17   Since the 
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First Amendment’s principle of content-neutrality would either permit both types 
of speech or neither, these cases contradict each other. Finally, in Hudgens v. 
NLRB, the Court admitted that the two cases were hopelessly inconsistent and 
formally overruled Logan Valley: “[T]he reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd 
cannot be squared with the reasoning  of the Court's opinion in Logan 
Valley....[W]e  make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of 
Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case.”18
In an idealized world, such inconsistencies could be avoided.  If the Court 
could always be candid about what it was doing, it would dispense with 
inconsistent prior decisions by overruling them explicitly.  Rational people should 
make rational decisions. 
Unfortunately, even in an idealized world populated by perfectly rational 
people, not all causes of irrational decision-making can be avoided.  The 
fundamental nature of group decision-making inevitably creates the possibility of 
certain kinds of irrationality.19  “Collective irrationality” is the term for the 
situation when a set of decisions, which are made by a group through some voting 
mechanism, would be regarded as irrational if made by a single individual.20  This 
can happen even though each individual participant is one hundred percent 
rational.
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 To understand how “collective irrationality” infects the Supreme Court, it is 
necessary to remember that when the Court hands down an opinion, it reflects the 
result of two different votes.  One is the “outcome,” specifically, which party 
prevails.  This votes takes place at the weekly conference of the Justices, with each 
Justice voting for a particular judgment, after a (usually) brief discussion of the 
merits of the case.21
The second “vote” is on the opinion explaining the reasoning that supports 
the judgment. The reasoning consists of the resolution of the relevant issues raised 
by each party as they argued why the judgment should go their way. The vote by 
the Court on the opinion is not a formal vote, but occurs after an opinion is drafted 
and circulated among the Justices.22    Each Justice decides, individually, whether 
to join that opinion, join only in the judgment and file a concurring opinion, or 
dissent from the judgment.23  If a majority of the voting Justices join an opinion, it 
becomes the opinion for the Supreme Court. 
Because there are generally only two choices for a judgment -- either the 
plaintiff wins or the defendant wins -- the vote by the Justices as to the appropriate 
judgment in the case almost always results in a majority choice.24  By contrast, it is 
common for there to be multiple issues to be decided for any given case.  It is this 
fact alone which will inevitably cause irrational decision-making.
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 The problem of creating a fool-proof system for selecting among multiple 
options is an intractable problem for any group, including the Supreme Court.  If 
there are only two choices for a group decision, a majority vote can readily decide 
between those choices.  If there are an odd number of voters, as with nine Justices, 
one of the two choices must receive more votes than the other, and that choice can 
rightfully be deemed the group’s choice.  In the words of Thomas Jefferson, 
“Individuals exercise [their rights] by their single will: collections of men by that 
of their majority; for the law of the majority is the natural law of every society of 
men.”25
If there are three choices, however, there is no guarantee that one choice will 
receive a majority of the votes cast. For centuries, theorists tried unsuccessfully to 
figure out the best way for treating a group decision where the votes are divided in 
such a way that no single choice captures more than half of the vote. 
Nobel Prize winning economist Kenneth S. Arrow proved that no reasonable 
group voting system for resolving facing multiple choices could avoid all 
inconsistency.  Specifically, he proved that under certain, relatively-modest 
conditions, there would always be the potential for what is known as “a lack of 
transitivity.”  Transitivity requires that preferences between several choices be 
consistent, so that if I prefer coffee to soda, and soda to tea, then I would also 
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prefer coffee to tea.  Given a choice of all three beverages, I would obviously 
choose my number one choice – coffee.  Arrow’s theorem establishes that any 
group decision-making process may well result in a lack of transitivity: Given a 
similar choice of the three beverages, the group might prefer coffee to soda, and 
soda to tea, but also prefers tea to coffee. While the scholarly discussion of 
Arrow’s theorem is voluminous,26 until now no one has identified any actual 
instance of a lack of transitivity within the Supreme Court. In this Article, I will 
display the first such example, but will also show why Arrow’s theorem is not a 
significant cause for “irrational” Supreme Court opinions.27
There is a second form of irrational group decision-making, though, that has 
occurred far more frequently and has only recently begun to receive significant 
scholarly attention.28  Specifically, on numerous occasions one party has received 
the votes of a majority of the Justices of the Court on every relevant issue yet lost 
the case anyway.   In these cases:
1) The Court agrees that if all of the relevant issues are decided in the one side’s  
favor, that side will win;
2) At least five of the nine Justices rule in favor of the same party on all relevant 
issues;
but
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3) The other party wins.29
In this Article, I will prove what I have termed the “Irrationality Theorem,”
 the proposition that there is no way to eliminate the possibility that a majority of 
the Supreme Court, (or any other multi-member tribunal) will vote that one party 
should lose on all the relevant issues in a case yet win the case anyway.  I will also 
show that there are several cases that unmistakably embody this irrationality.
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II. A [blunt?] Arrow Aimed at the Heart of the Supreme Court 
If a group votes on more than two choices, there is no guarantee that a 
majority will favor one position.  More troublesome, the choice that gets the most 
votes, might actually be the choice most strongly opposed by a majority.  Thus, an 
extremist candidate, with 40% of the vote, could defeat two moderate candidates 
who split the remaining vote, even though 60% of the electorate would greatly 
prefer either of the two losing candidates.
One solution to multi-choice elections was proposed by the 18th century 
French mathematician Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet.  
Condorcet, who was a friend of both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin.  
Condorcet dreamed of inventing a concept of "social mathematics" which would 
create a government and society ruled by reason.30  To say that Condorcet's 
mathematical writing was not initially well-received is a considerable 
understatement:
The obscurity and self-contradiction are without any parallel, so 
far as our experience of mathematical works extend...no amount 
of examples can convey an adequate impression of the evils.  We 
believe that the work has been very little studied, for we have not 
observed any recognition of the repulsive peculiarities by which it 
is so undesirably distinguished.31
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Ultimately, though, the Condorcet plan became accepted as one of the more 
plausible attempts to deal with elections involving multiple choices.  Basically, 
Condorcet’s proposal was to divide the vote on multiple options  into a series of 
two-way, head-to-head battles. The “winner” would be the choice that obtains a 
simple majority over every other possibility in two-way competition.  The winner 
of these head-to-head battles is generally called the "Condorcet winner."32
For example, consider if nine voters list their preference between three 
candidates (A, B, and C) in the following way:
2 voters 3 voters 4 voters
FIRST A B C
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
SECOND B A B
THIRD C C A
Since no candidate received a majority of the first-place votes, the 
Condorcet plan calls for a series of head-to-head matches.  Among all the voters, 
Candidate B is preferred over Candidate A, by 7 votes (4+3) to 2.  Candidate B is 
also preferred over Candidate C by 5 votes (3+2) to 4.  Thus, Candidate B, having 
won all the head-to-head matches, would be declared the Condorcet winner.
-13-
Unfortunately, the Condorcet strategy of head-to-head competition is not
without its problems.  The most serious weakness is that it frequently will not 
produce a winner.  This situation can be seen in the following simple story.  Three 
people, Alice, Bob, and Charles, were trying to select which flavor ice cream to 
serve at a party.  They ranked their preferences in the following order:
Alice Bob Charles
FIRST Vanilla Chocolate Strawberry
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
SECOND Strawberry Vanilla Chocolate
THIRD Chocolate Strawberry Vanilla
Each of the three flavors receives one first place vote, so there is no simple 
majority winner.  Unfortunately, the Condorcet criterion will not help either.  In a 
head-to-head contest, Chocolate bests Vanilla 2-1.  In a similar match-up,  Vanilla 
beats Strawberry 2-1 .  The difficulty arises because Strawberry defeats Chocolate 
2-1.  No choice prevailed in all of its head-to-head matches.
This is an example of group irrationality.  If I announce a  preference for 
Chocolate over Vanilla, and for Vanilla over Strawberry,  it would be considered 
irrational for me to then say that I also prefer Strawberry to Chocolate (If 3 is 
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greater than 2, and 2 is greater than 1, we naturally expect 3 to be greater than 1 
also.) Yet this type of illogic, termed a lack of transitivity, is what has resulted 
from the group decision process utilizing the Condorcet criterion. It is also known 
as "cycling" because every winner also loses.33
The following chart shows the essence of the lack of transitivity:
Contest Winner
Chocolate vs Vanilla Chocolate
Vanilla vs Strawberry Vanilla
Strawberry vs  Chocolate Strawberry
The lack of transitivity creates a real danger for democracy.  In particular, 
the person who sets the agenda can control the outcome of the voting.34  If the 
person in charge of voting procedures favored Chocolate in the ice cream example, 
she could stage the first head-to-head match between Vanilla and Strawberry, 
which Vanilla wins, and the second between Vanilla and Chocolate, which 
Chocolate wins [Agenda I].  A leader with a difference preference could start with 
Vanilla versus Chocolate, which Chocolate wins, followed by Strawberry versus 
Chocolate, with Strawberry prevailing [Agenda II].  Thus, the result of the election 
does not turn on the will of the group so much as the manipulation of those with
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control over the agenda.
Agenda I
Contest   Winner 
Round 1 Vanilla vs Strawberry Vanilla
Round 2 Vanilla vs Chocolate Chocolate 
Agenda II
Round 1 Chocolate vs Vanilla Chocolate
Round 2 Strawberry vs  Chocolate    Strawberry
The Rev. Charles L. Dodgson, better known by his pen-name Lewis Carroll, 
wrote extensively about voting theory, and argued that cycling created a fatal flaw 
in Condorcet’s proposal.35  He mocked the defenders of the Condorcet criterion: 
I am quite prepared to be told... "Oh, that is an extreme case: it 
could never really happen!" Now I have observed that this answer 
is always given instantly, with perfect confidence, and without any 
examination of the proposed case.  It must therefore rest on some 
general principle: the mental process being probably something 
like this –“I have formed a theory.  This case contradicts my 
theory. Therefore this is an extreme case, and would never occur 
in practice.”36
In 1951, economist and future Nobel Prize winner, Kenneth Arrow proved 
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that every possible voting scheme for choosing between more than two candidates 
can produce either a lack of transitivity or undemocratic results.37 Arrow's 
"General Possibility Theorem," which is more commonly called his "impossibility
theorem," proves that no possible voting system can prevent cycling and 
simultaneously meet the following four, relatively simple goals:
(1) If every person in the group prefers one choice to another, so does the 
group. (Unanimity)
(2)  No individual person is able to act as a dictator, whose vote determines 
the outcome regardless of the preferences of the other group members. 
(Nondictatorship)
(3) When comparing choices, individuals are free to prefer these choices in 
any order. (Range or “citizens’ sovereignty”)
(4) If an individual or group has a preference between two options, the 
preference between those two will not be affected by consideration of other 
options. (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives)
Arrow's theorem has been summarized as follows: "No voting rule which 
allows voters to express their true preference and which treats each preference as 
equally decisive can assure us that it will produce a single preferred choice for 
three or more voters who have at least three alternatives."38  The implications of 
-17-
this theorem are staggering.  As economist Paul Samuelson wrote in 1952, "The 
search of the great minds of recorded history for the perfect democracy, it turns 
out, is the search for a chimera, for a logical self-contradiction."39
Because Arrow’s Theorem applies to any group’s attempt to reach an 
aggregate decision, the theorem can also be applied to the Supreme Court.40 Judge 
(then-Professor) Easterbrook wrote that Arrow’s Theorem proved that the Court’s 
decisions would inevitably become inconsistent with one another: “At least some 
inconsistency, and probably a great deal of inconsistency, is inevitable.”41  While 
Arrow’s Theorem has much to say about group decisions, including those of the 
Supreme Court, one must be careful in drawing practical conclusions of 
“inevitability” from principles of axiomatic logic.
First of all, it is not necessary for members of the Court to decide on a 
complete preference order ranking before reaching a decision.  In reality, all a  
Justice need do is decide his or her favored option for all the issues. If there is no 
majority support for a particular set of conclusions, the Justices decide whether 
they prefer some alternate choice [which creates a majority] to their individual top 
choice [with no majority opinion for the Court].  This might occur if a Justice 
either wanted an issue settled or preferred creating a somewhat-desirable precedent 
to holding out for his or her most desired position.42  Significantly, even these 
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circumstances do not require that any Justice make a complete ranking of all voting  
permutations. 
Moreover, even were a Justice to make such a complete ranking order, it will 
rarely be disclosed. While Justices often will discuss their position on various 
issues in the same case, according to the best of my research, there is no case in 
which all of the  Justices have detailed a preference order for every permutation of 
issues involved.43 Without such a total ranking, it is impossible for anyone to 
determine the aggregated preference order for the Court.  
Even with a complete preference ranking of all the Justices, the nature of 
Supreme Court voting minimizes the significance of a lack of transitivity.  To see 
why, consider a variation of the Pentagon Papers case, where President Nixon 
acted on his own authority to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information on 
the grounds of national security.44  Assume that, as in the real case, there were two 
issues: 1) Did the President’s unilateral action violate the Separations of Power;  
and 2) Did the enjoining of the newspaper violate the First Amendment?  If the 
newspaper prevailed on either or both of these issues, the injunction would be 
lifted. 
Assume that, unlike the real case, all of the Justices wanted the injunction 
lifted.45  Thus, the choice of  “no violation of either Separation of Powers or First 
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Amendment” would be everyone’s least preferred option.Next, assume that the 
group of Justices Brennan, White, Stewart, and Marshall, was so anxious to show 
its disapproval of the President, that their strongest preference was to have the 
injunction lifted on both Separation of Powers and the First Amendment grounds.46
Their next preference was for Separation of Powers grounds alone, with their third  
preference being relying on only the First Amendment.  
Further, imagine that Justices Douglas and Black were First Amendment 
fanatics, and that their strongest preference was to have the injunction lifted on 
First Amendment grounds alone, with their next preference being relying on both 
the First Amendment and Separation of Powers.47 Thus, their third  preference was 
relying on only the Separation of Powers. 
Finally, imagine that Justices Harlan, Burger, and Blackmun, were most 
concerned with Separation of Powers but believed that finding both a Separation of 
Powers and  the First Amendment violation would be an unnecessary insult to the 
President.  Thus, their first preference was to have the injunction lifted on 
Separation of Powers grounds alone, their second preference was to have the 
injunction lifted on First Amendment grounds alone, with their third preference 
relying on both.
The Justices’ preference order would then appear as follows:
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Marshall, White,
Stewart 
[3 votes]
Douglas, Black, 
Brennan,
[3 votes]
Harlan, Burger, 
Blackmun 
[3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
2 Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Violates Both Only Violates 1st
Amendment
3 Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Violates Both
4 Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
Head-to-head voting results in an unbreakable cycle among the top three 
choices:  “Violates Both” defeats “Only Violates Sep of Powers”  by a 6-3 vote 
[with the Marshall and Douglas groups prevailing]; “Only Violates Sep of Powers” 
defeats “Only Violates 1st Am” by a 6-3 vote [with the Marshall  and Harlan 
groups prevailing]; and “Only Violates 1st Am” defeats “Violates Both” by a 6-
3vote [with the Douglas and Harlan groups prevailing].  Thus, there is no 
Condorcet winner and no transitivity.
The Court’s decision, however, would in all likelihood not reveal the full 
preference rankings, so that no one, not even the Justices themselves, would know 
about the cycling. In fact, the Court might issue a unanimous judgment  supporting 
the newspaper with three separate opinions expressing a different set of issue 
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resolutions.  It is also possible, though, that the Court  would end with an opinion 
with “shifting majorities,” holding that the President violated both the Separation 
of Powers and  the First Amendment.48 Justice Marshall would write such an 
opinion which he and his three supporters would embrace completely.  The other 
groups would sign onto to only the part with which they agreed.  That way each 
group obtained what it wanted most: Douglas’s group would get the First 
Amendment decision they wanted, Harlan’s would get their preferred Separation of 
Powers decision, and Marshall’s would get their preferred outcome.49
Thus, the lack of transitivity does not prevent the Court from resolving the 
dispute before it.  Moreover,  the process of Supreme Court voting will be able to 
mask the very existence of such cycling, were it to occur.
It is not even clear that all of conditions necessary for Arrow’s theorem 
relate to Supreme Court decision-making.  Professor Maxwell Stearns argues 
convincingly that the Supreme Court does not fulfill Arrow’s requirement of 
unlimited “range” in voting.50  Stearns points to two aspects of Supreme Court 
decision-making which prevent the Justices from “ranking the underlying 
rationales offered in the various opinions in a given case in any conceivable 
order.”51  First, every case is decided by outcome-voting, the dichotomous choice 
of which party wins.52  Second, majority opinions are often created only by 
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deferring to the Justice who holds the “narrowest” grounds for supporting the 
winning side.53  These two factors reduce the sovereignty of the Justices because 
they, “significantly limit strategic interactions among the justices....”54  Thus, the 
condition of “range” may not apply to the Supreme Court.
Even if one concludes that all four of Arrow’s conditions do apply to the 
Supreme Court, there remains the question of what exactly is proven about the 
Court’s decision-making.   According to Easterbrook,“as time goes on and the 
stock of precedent grows .... [t]he availability of inconsistent precedents allows the 
Justices to ‘prove’ anything they want, without fear of contradiction.”55  If 
precedent is viewed narrowly, however, Arrow’s Theorem does not create a 
serious a problem of inconsistent Supreme Court constitutional decisions.  If 
“precedent” is limited to the circumscribed question of whether a particular 
Constitutional provision is violated by a particular type of situation, there is little 
problem with a lack of transitivity because a Court faced with a [narrowly-defined] 
precedent it dislikes, is free to vote to overturn it.56 Since each vote on overruling 
is dichotomous, there is no danger of cycling.  Thus, while the Court will be 
“inconsistent” in its decisions made at different times, it will not face a stable of 
inconsistent precedents.
“Precedent” may be considered more broadly, however. If the precedent 
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from a particular constitutional decision is not merely whether or not a particular 
clause is violated, but also includes the “values or principles” which can be 
extracted for that case,57 Arrow’s theorem may conceivably create a problem.  
There are countless different precedential “values or principles” that can be found 
in the Court’s decisions.  In weighing the importance of each “value or principle,” 
each of the nine Justices would undoubtedly present a different preference order.  
According to Arrow’s Theorem, in attempting to aggregate the individual 
preferences into a complete ranking order, the Court will inevitably stumble into 
cycling problems. 
As we saw with the ice cream paradox described earlier, consider three 
values (A, B, and C)58 preferred by the Justices (1-9) in the following order:
Justices 1,2,3 Justices 4,5,6 Justices 7,8,9
FIRST Value A Value B Value C
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
SECOND Value B Value C Value A
THIRD Value C Value A Value B
Each of the values receives three first place votes, so there is no simple 
majority winner.  In a head-to-head contest, value A beats B 6-3.  In a similar 
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match-up, value B defeats C 6-3, but value C also defeats A, 6-3. The value 
preferences are not transitive.
The inconsistency predicted by Arrow might be manifested in two ways.  If 
all three values were implicated by the same case, the Court might be unable to 
reach a majority opinion.  Each group of three Justices would join one of three  
different opinion arguing that a different value should determine the case.  The 
judgment of the split Court would depend on which party was favored by at least 
two of the competing values.  This would not pose problem of collective 
irrationality; it would merely be an example of collective disagreement.  Indeed, if 
the values supporting the prevailing judgment are not mutually exclusive, it is 
likely that a majority opinion could be written incorporating the multiple values 
supporting it.59
A different, and more troubling, type of inconsistency could arise over 
several cases if only two values are considered at a time. In the first case, for 
example, a majority of the Court would vote that Value A is more important than 
Value B.  In the next case, a majority of the Court could rationally vote that Value 
B is more important than Value C.  Finally, this Court would face a new case and, 
a different majority of rational Justices, could conclude that Value C is more 
important than Value A.  Thus, those trying to reconcile the Court’s precedent 
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would perceive, correctly, that a Court consisting of perfectly logical individuals 
had created an irrational precedential preference order. 
Using Arrow’s Theorem to explain specific Court decisions, though, 
requires great caution. Most of the inconsistency that can be found in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions are attributable to other factors than the inevitability of cycling.
First, Arrow’s Theorem only speaks to cycling among the same group of 
voters.  Arrow’s proof was motivated by, and limited to, an exploration of the, 
“methods of aggregating individual tastes which imply rational behavior on the 
part of the community....”60  For the Supreme Court, that “community” consists of 
the nine Justices hearing a particular case at a particular time. It does not take a 
mathematical proof to establish that different “communities” can reach decisions 
which are inconsistent with one another or which rely on inconsistent values and 
principles. 
In U.S. v. Morrison, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, ruled that the 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act which provided a federal civil 
remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence exceeded Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause.61  The Court held that Congress may not “regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce.”62  According to the Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
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opinion for the Court: “In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few 
principles that has been consistent since the Clause was adopted.”63
The four-Justice dissenting opinion authored by Justice Souter, disagreed.  
He argued that, “Our cases... stand for the following [proposition]. Congress has 
the power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”64
If Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct, the earlier cases, such as those 
upholding federal laws protecting civil rights and outlawing loan sharking,65 are 
not inconsistent with Morrison; they simply presented an issue different from a law 
banning violent, non-economic conduct.   Even if Justice Souter is correct, the 
“inconsistency” between Morrison and the earlier cases would not have been 
caused by a lack of transitivity.  Rather, a majority of the Court in the year 2000 
merely had a different set of values (preserving a sphere of regulation for the 
States) than those on earlier Courts (deferring  to Congress’s view of the national 
economic welfare). Similarly   the “inconsistency” between the Court of the 1960's 
and the 1990's,66 can be more readily attributed to a change in values of the voting 
Justices, rather than to the inevitable cycling of values.
A second caution about using Arrow’s Theorem to explain Supreme Court 
decision-making is that, because the Supreme Court does not vote by ranking 
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individual preferences, plurality opinions are generally not caused by cycling.  
Take the case of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., holding that a law banning public 
nudity, including nude dancing, did not violate the First Amendment.67  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote for three Justices that the statute was justified by the state's 
interest in protecting societal order and morality.68 Justice Scalia wrote that 
because the statute was a law of general applicability, it could not violate the First 
Amendment.69 Justice Souter wrote that the law as applied did not violate the First 
Amendment because of the State’s interest in combating the “secondary effects of 
adult establishments.”70
 A lower court, attempting to ascertain the meaning of Barnes, blamed the 
confusion on Arrow’s Theorem: 
In any case in which the Court does not produce a majority 
opinion, and there are several different issues on which the 
members of the Court disagree, it may follow that no single line of 
reasoning can be described that is both internally consistent and is 
subscribed to by a majority with respect to each premise and 
conclusion. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and 
Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).... 71
This is an example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.  The 
problem in Barnes is not explained by Arrow’s Theorem.  Since the Supreme 
Court does not engage in “head-to-head” voting between pairs of “several different  
issues,” there is no lack of transitivity in this case.  There is no internal 
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inconsistency that becomes apparent when a different result is achieved by altering 
the order in which the Court voted.  As with virtually all cases involving plurality 
decisions, it is simply the result of the Justices, faced with more than two options, 
dividing so that there is no majority.  This is not Arrow’s Theorem but grade 
school arithmetic.
A final serious limitation on the applicability of Arrow’s Theorem to 
Supreme Court decision-making is that, for cycling actually to cause the Court to 
create conflicting precedents, the conflicting values could not all be raised initially 
in the same case.  If forced to confront a conflicting preference order of principles 
at the same time, the lack of transitivity would create a split Court, unable to reach 
any majority opinion, and unable to create any precedent at all.  Thus, the lack of 
transitivity will create a pool of inconsistent precedents only where different pairs 
of principles arise in separate cases raising unrelated issues.  The lack of 
transitivity would then only cause a problem if those principles subsequently arise 
together in a case where somehow they are all relevant to deciding the same issue.
This requirement further reduces the likelihood that Arrow’s Theorem will 
actually be the cause of Court being able to “prove” anything it wants, “without 
fear of contradiction.”72  One commentator stated that looking for actual real-world 
examples of the problems caused by cycling was akin to “hunting for the Loch 
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Ness monster: appearances are few and far between, and some of the sightings are 
suspect.”73   While no one has previously attributed any particular Court decisions 
to Arrow’s Theorem, I believe I have spotted the tell-tale footprints of the creature.
A rare example of a lack of transitivity can be seen in a trio of cases 
involving the following question: When multiple issues are presented to the Court, 
in what priority order should the issues be addressed?   In a 1974 case,  National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers,74 the 
Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the discontinuance of train service by 
a group of passengers.  There were two primary issues: 1) Whether the Amtrak Act 
created a private cause of action; and 2) Whether the plaintiffs had standing under 
the Act.   The Court stated that the first issue to be addressed was whether there 
was a private cause of action because, “[s]ince we hold that no right of action 
exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction become immaterial.”75
In the 1984 case, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,76 consumers 
challenged a milk market order of the Secretary of Agriculture.   The Court of 
Appeals found that the consumers had constitutional standing but lacked standing 
under the relevant statute.  The Supreme Court addressed the statutory standing 
issue first, and, finding that Congress did not intend to grant standing to 
consumers, declared there was no reason to decide the constitutional standing 
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issue.77
Finally, in 1998, in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,78
the Court decided an environmental case with two issues: 1) whether the relevant 
law created a private cause of action for “purely past violations”; and 2) whether 
the plaintiffs had constitutional standing.  The Court ruled that the constitutional 
standing must be decided first, because, “Article III jurisdiction is always an 
antecedent question....”79
We are thus left with a true lack of transitivity.80  When the issues were 
“private cause of action” and “statutory standing,” cause of action was decided 
first.  When the issues were “statutory standing,” and “constitutional standing,”  
statutory standing was decided first.  When the issues are “constitutional standing,” 
and “cause of action,” however, constitutional standing was decided first.  The 
following chart reveals that this is the same cycling as in the ice cream scenario:
Choice of Issues Which Is Decided First?
Cause of Action vs Statutory Standing Cause of Action
Statutory Standing vs Constitutional Standing Statutory Standing
Cause of Action vs Constitutional Standing Constitutional Standing
The illogic of these results can be seen by considering a case which raises all 
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three issues: cause of action, statutory standing, and constitutional standing.  Based 
on the three cases, how could a court know where to begin?  For any issue you 
choose, there is another which has been found to be “antecedent”.
The fact that a true example of cycling has been identified does not mean 
that it is commonplace.  In fact, the creation of this lack of transitivity required an 
extremely unusual situation where three related issues arose in separate pairings in 
different cases.  Further, for lack of transitivity to be a problem, the three issues 
must finally arise in the same case.  If only two of these issues recur, the Court will 
simply reach the same conclusion it did the first time that pairing occurred.81 Only 
if the Court is required to resolve the three issues in the same case will it be 
thwarted by the lack of transitivity.  Since the above trio of cases were decided, 
however, no Supreme Court case has presented all three issues simultaneously.  
Arrow’s theorem stays in its quiver.
Significantly, however, the nature of Supreme Court decision-making can 
create a true type of irrationality, one quite distinct from the cycling described by 
Condorcet and Arrow. The next section provides a proof that irrationality is 
possible in any case with two distinct issues, and that such irrationality has 
occurred many times.
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III. The Irrationality Theorem
Suppose I were to say, “I will take an umbrella either if it is raining now or 
the forecast calls for rain. It is both raining and the forecast says ‘rain today.’  
Therefore, I won’t take my umbrella.”  Such a decision would be considered 
irrational, because every condition for taking my umbrella was met yet I reached 
the opposite conclusion.82  Assuming there is no other reason for not taking my 
umbrella (i.e., I want to get wet or you are taking an umbrella for both of us), a 
rational person should not reach such a conclusion.
Unfortunately, though, groups like the Supreme Court can, and sometimes 
do, reach similar irrational conclusions. In several cases, one party garnered the 
support of a majority of the Justices on every relevant issue, and still lost the case.  
This irrationality is not merely aesthetically unpleasing.  It creates an unworkable 
situation for lower courts attempting to apply Supreme Court precedent faithfully, 
and creates the real possibility of unfairness that disputes raising similar issues will 
be resolved differently. One recent case,  Miller v. Albright,83 reveals both the 
structure of institutional irrationality and the confusion which inevitably follows.
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A. Miller and Sex Discrimination
The primary claim in Miller was that a provision of the federal naturalization 
law amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination.84 When only one parent of an 
illegitimate child is an American citizen, federal law creates different rules for 
obtaining citizenship for that child, depending on the sex of the citizen parent. 
Children born abroad and out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not to citizen 
mothers, must obtain formal proof of a biological connection with the citizen 
parent by age 18.  Lorelyn Penero Miller, who was born to an unmarried couple 
(her mother was a Filipino national and her father was an American citizen), was 
denied an American passport and filed suit in federal court.
There were three main issues in the case.  First, did the federal courts have 
the power to grant the relief sought, a judgment declaring her a citizen of the 
United States?  Second, since Miller was not treated differently because of her own 
sex, did she have standing to raise the claim of gender discrimination on behalf of 
her father?  Third, did the law unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sex?  
For Miller to win the case, she needed to prevail on all three issues.
A badly fractured Court issued four major different opinions.85  Writing only 
for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens ruled for the Government. 
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He stated that the Court had the power to declare Miller a citizen, and that she had 
standing to raise the sex discrimination issue.  Nonetheless, he wrote that the law 
did not violate equal protection because it was based on real differences between 
male and female parents in “ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship,” 
and not on the “accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about the 
members of either sex.”86
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, did not address 
whether the law violated the equal protection clause, but did find that Miller had 
standing to raise the sex discrimination claim for her father.87 Justice Scalia found 
for the Government, though, on the grounds that the Court had no power to issue 
the requested remedy, “conferral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed 
by Congress.”88
Justice O’Connor, writing for herself and Justice Kennedy, also ruled for the 
Government.  She wrote that in light of the “ presumption against third-party 
standing,” Miller did not have standing to raise the claim that her father received 
differential treatment due to his sex.89  While not addressing the issue of whether 
the Court would have had the power to issue the requested remedy, O’Connor 
stated that the law could not pass the constitutional standard for sex discrimination: 
“Although I do not share Justice Stevens' assessment that the provision withstands 
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heightened scrutiny, I believe it passes rational scrutiny for the reasons he gives for 
sustaining it under the higher standard.”90
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and 
Souter joined.91  He wrote that Miller should win the case.  First, because of her 
close relationship with her father, and the fact that the Government had 
successfully convinced the district court to dismiss her father from the suit, Miller 
had standing to raise his sex discrimination claim.92  Second, the Court had the 
power to grant the desired remedy, since the statute would automatically confer 
citizenship with the offending section removed.  Finally, Breyer wrote that the law 
unconstitutionally discriminated based on sex. 
Thus, the Court ruled that one party [the Government] should win the case 
even though a majority of the Justices apparently believed that the winning party 
was wrong on every relevant constitutional issue. By putting the votes of the 
different Justices in chart form, we can see this astounding result.
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Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Does Miller 
Have Standing 
To Raise Her 
Father’s 
Constitutional 
Claim?
Does Law’s 
Gender-Based 
Distinction 
Violate Equal 
Protection?
Can Court 
Award Relief 
Without 
Violating 
Separation of 
Powers?
Does Miller 
Win?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
O’Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Scalia (2) Yes (2) Not Say (2) No (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 7-2 Yes 5-2 Yes 5-2 No 6-3 
Had the same five Justices voted a) that Miller had standing to raise the sex 
discrimination claim; b) that the law unconstitutionally discriminated based on sex;  
and c) that the Court had the power to issue the requested remedy, Miller obviously 
would have won the case.  It would be irrational for any individual Justice to have 
voted for Miller on all three issues, yet vote that she should lose the case.  Yet that 
is precisely what the Court in its collective decision-making concluded.
The consequences flowing from the irrationality of a decision like Miller are 
more than intellectually unappealing.  They create insurmountable difficulties for 
those wish to understand the law, especially those who are duty-bound to follow 
the Court’s interpretation of the Law of the Land.
Lower courts attempting to interpret Miller were unable to agree on how to 
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overcome its confusing outcome.   Some courts described Miller as declaring that 
gender discrimination will likely never be constitutional.  For example, in Rainey 
v. Chever,93 the Georgia Supreme Court struck down an inheritance law which 
prevented fathers from inheriting from  illegitimate child if they had failed  to 
provide support for the child.  The Georgia court, in finding the differential 
treatment of fathers and mothers violative of equal protection, relied on the 
following characterization of  Miller: “[The Supreme] Court agreed it would be 
unlikely that any gender classification based on stereotypes could survive 
heightened scrutiny.”94
Other courts extracted the precisely opposite holding from Miller.  In the 
words of one judge, “the [Miller] Court held that it is not an  equal protection 
violation to impose certain requirements on children claiming citizenship through 
their fathers while not imposing those same requirements on children claiming 
citizenship through their mothers.”95
Three years after Miller, the issue of the constitutionality of the 
naturalization law again reached in the Supreme Court . Unlike in Miller, though, 
the Court in Nguyen v. INS, was able to reach a majority decision.96  Because the 
father brought the suit in Nguyen, there was no issue as to standing to raise the 
claim of gender discrimination.  The two Justices who had found no standing in 
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Miller, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, parted ways in Nguyen, with Kennedy 
writing the majority opinion finding that the naturalization law did not constitute 
unconstitutional sex discrimination.  Joining him were the only two Justices who 
had voiced that view in Miller [Stevens and Rehnquist], as well as the two Justices 
[Scalia and Thomas] who had based their votes on their conclusion that the federal 
courts lacked the remedial  power to to confer citizenship on a basis other than that 
contained in a statutory mandate.97
When Justice Kennedy in Nguyen described the votes of the various Justices 
in Miller he made an interesting omission.  He described that splintered Miller vote 
as follows:
Four Justices, in two different opinions, rejected the challenge 
to the gender-based distinction, rejected the challenge to the 
gender-based distinction, two finding the statute consistent with 
the Fifth Amendment,(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by 
REHNQUIST, C. J.), and two concluding that the court could 
not confer citizenship as a remedy even if the statute violated 
equal protection, (SCALIA, J., joined by THOMAS, J., 
concurring in judgment). Three Justices reached a contrary 
result, and would have found the statue violative of equal 
protection. (GINSBURG J., joined by SOUTER and BREYER, 
JJ., dissenting); (BREYER, J., joined by SOUTER and 
GINSBURG, JJ., dissenting). Finally, two Justices did not reach 
the issue as to the father, having determined that the child, the 
only petitioner in Miller, lacked standing to raise the equal 
protection rights of his father.  (O'CONNOR, J., joined by 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment).98
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Amazingly, he did not mention that the opinion of “O'CONNOR, J., joined 
by KENNEDY, J.”, also contained the following statement which indicated that 
the law could not survive an equal protection challenge: “Although I do not share 
JUSTICE STEVENS' assessment that the provision withstands heightened 
scrutiny....”99
Freed from that earlier conclusion, Justice Kennedy proceeded to find that 
the naturalization law did indeed meet the “mid-level” scrutiny test for sex 
discrimination.  He found that the law was substantially related to the two 
important goals of 1) “assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists” 
between the citizen parent and child, and 2) “ensur[ing] that the child and the 
citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop ... a 
relationship that ... consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection 
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”100  According to 
Kennedy, insisting on gender-neutral rules for accomplishing these purposes would 
be, “[t]o fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences ....The 
difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, 
and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the 
problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”101
Justice O’Connor authored an angry dissent.  Speaking for four justices,  she 
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derided Justice Kennedy’s opinion as relying on an anachronistic, “stereotype, to 
say that fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on 
similar terms [with mothers.]”102.   She concluded her attack by focusing on the 
majority’s opinion sloppy use of precedent: 
 No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful 
application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence 
concerning sex-based classifications. Today's decision instead
represents a deviation from a line of cases in which we have 
vigilantly applied heightened scrutiny to such classifications to 
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred.103
Irrational decisions such as Miller are not only confusing and potentially 
misleading, they are an inevitable result of collective decision-making. Even when 
each individual Justice is acting rationally, the nature of the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making will always create the possibility of irrationality. In the next 
section, I offer a formal, rigorous proof of the Irrationality Theorem.
B. PROOF OF THE IRRATIONALITY THEOREM
As with all proofs, it is necessary to begin by defining critical terms.  
An “outcome” is the ultimate determination as to which of two parties
prevails.  There are, of course, more than two possible dispositions of a case by the 
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Supreme Court.  A lower court ruling can be “affirmed,” it can be “reversed and 
remanded,” or the case can be “dismissed.”  In simple terms, however, a 
“dismissal” will favor one party or the other [usually the defendant in the original 
law suit].  Thus, if the defendant prevailed in the Court of Appeals, both a 
“dismissal” and an “affirmance” can be regarded as a victory. This can also be 
termed “winning the case.”
An “issue” is a question before the Court whose resolution can determine 
directly the outcome of a case.104
Two issues are sequential if a) one of the issues (which can be termed the 
preliminary issue) must be resolved in order for the Court to reach the other issue 
(which can be termed the secondary issue); b) if one party prevails on the 
preliminary issue the Court reaches the secondary issue, but if the other party 
prevails on the preliminary issue, it wins the case; and c) whenever the secondary 
issue is reached by the Court, whoever prevails on that issue wins the case.105
 For example, a plaintiff must prevail on jurisdiction, the preliminary issue,  
before reaching the merits of the claim, the secondary issue.  If the defendant wins 
on jurisdiction, the defendant wins without the need to discuss the merits. If the 
plaintiff wins on jurisdiction, the court will decide the merits, and whoever prevails 
on the merits wins the case.106
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Two issues are independent if they are not sequential. For example, if a law 
prohibiting unmarried people from using birth control is challenged on both equal 
protection and due process grounds, a finding of either violation results in the law 
being struck down.
If there are two issues, there are precisely four possible ways any individual 
Justice can vote on the issues [assuming a vote on both issues].  If we term the 
parties “Plaintiff” and “Defendant,” either the  Plaintiff would win both issues; the 
Defendant would win both issues; the Plaintiff would win the first but lose the
second; or the Plaintiff would win the second but loses the first.  The latter two 
scenarios, where a different party prevails on one of the two issues, can be termed 
split votes.  A “unified vote” occurs if there are at least two issues, and the same 
party prevails on all of them. 
Two issues are “distinct” if a) they are either sequential or independent, and 
b) for all possible combination of votes on the two issues, none would be 
irrational.107
A particular  issue or outcome is a “loser” if its negation receives the votes 
of a majority of the Court.  “Negation” means the logical dichotomous inverse: 
one party either wins or loses; a particular clause either applies or does not apply. 
Thus, if a majority of Justices vote that the Court had the power to declare 
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someone a citizen,  the proposition that the Court does not have such power is a 
“loser.”108
The “result” of the case is the resolution of the outcome and the relevant 
issues.
“Rational” means logically consistent.
“Irrational” means logically inconsistent.
An “irrational result” occurs if one party is a loser on every issue in a case 
and wins the case anyway.  Obviously, if there were only one issue in a case, it 
would be irrational for one side to prevail on that issue and lose on the ultimate 
outcome.  Similarly, if there were multiple issues, it would be irrational if one side 
prevailed on all of the issues and lost on the ultimate outcome.109
We are now ready to state the Irrationality Theorem:
In a Court with at least three members, for any case with at least two 
distinct issues, there will always be the possibility that the result will be 
irrational, even when the vote of each individual Justice is acting in a rational 
manner.
The proof of the Irrationality Theorem is straight-forward:
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We can begin with the simplest situation. Assume that there are two parties 
and two distinct issues.110  The two issues are either sequential or independent. 
Assume first, that the issues are sequential, and that the preliminary issue 
(for example, jurisdiction), must be won by one party (the Plaintiff) in order to get 
the Court to consider the secondary issue (i.e. the merits). Therefore, if the Plaintiff 
loses on jurisdiction, the Defendant wins, even if the Plaintiff would have won a 
majority on the merits. 
The only way for the Plaintiff to win the case is to win on both jurisdiction 
and the merits.  If the Plaintiff wins on jurisdiction and loses on the merits, the 
Defendant will still win the case.  Thus, under both split vote scenarios, the 
Plaintiff winning on jurisdiction and losing on the merits, or the Plaintiff winning 
on the merits, but losing on the jurisdiction , the Defendant wins the case.  This can 
be generalized to the statement that if there are two distinct sequential issues, the 
same party will win each split vote permutation.
It can also be proven that if there are two distinct independent issues, the 
same party will win each split vote permutation.  We begin by assuming the 
contrary, that a different party would win the case depending on which of the two 
split votes scenarios occurred.  Since it does not matter who wins which scenario, 
we can chart this story by letting the Defendant win the case if he wins on Issue A 
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and  loses on Issue B, and letting the Plaintiff win the case if she wins on Issue A 
and loses on Issue B.
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue A
Defendant wins
Issue A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue B
P wins A
P wins B
P WINS CASE
I
D wins A
P wins B
D WINS CASE
II
ISSUE B Defendant wins 
Issue B
P wins A
D wins B
P WINS CASE
III
D wins A
D wins B
D WINS CASE
IV
This chart reveals that, in all four voting possibilities, whoever wins Issue A 
wins the case.  In none of the possibilities does Issue B affect the outcome of the 
case.  Because we have defined an issue as a question that “can determine directly 
the outcome of a case,” Issue B cannot be considered an issue.  Thus, we have a 
contradiction, and our assumption that a different party would win the case 
depending on which of the two split votes scenarios occurred must be erroneous.  
Therefore, we can conclude that whenever there are two distinct independent 
issues, the same party will win the case for each split vote permutation.
Therefore, in any case with two distinct issues, sequential or independent, 
the same party will win the case each split vote permutation. 
Next, let X be any even number, such that there are X + 1 Justices.  This 
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ensures an odd number of voters.111  Note that ½ X is always less than a majority 
because  ½X is less than  ½ (X +1).  In particular, on the Supreme Court, there are 
8 + 1 Justices, and ½ of 8, or 4, is less than a majority.  On the other hand, ½X + 1 
is always enough for a majority (on the Supreme Court, 4 +1 =5, constituting a 
majority).  Similarly, X is always sufficient for a majority (on the Court, 8 is a 
majority).
Assume we have two distinct issues. Because we have distinct issues, it is 
rational for an individual Justice to either vote in favor of the same party on both 
issues or split their votes.  In one permissible breakdown of votes, ½X of the 
Justices would vote for one split vote permutation, and  ½X of the Justices vote for 
the other split vote permutation. Note that it has already been proven that the same 
party [call him the Defendant] will win under either split vote alternative. Now, 
assume that the remaining Justice chooses the unified vote in which the other party 
[call her the Plaintiff] won. On the Supreme Court, that would be the same as if 4 
Justices voted for one split vote permutation, 4 Justices vote for the other split vote 
permutation, and the remaining Justice voted for the unified vote under which the 
Plaintiff prevails.
With the vote of that remaining Justice, a majority of voters  (½X + 1 or 5) 
have voted for the Plaintiff on each of the two issues.  However, since the 
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Defendant wins on either split vote permutations, he wins the case because a 
majority of voters (X out of X +1, or 8 out of 9) have voted with split votes.
Thus, the majority decision on each issue is in the Plaintiff ’s favor, yet a 
majority has voted that the Defendant should win the case. Thus, the Court has 
reached an irrational result.112
Of course, this does not mean that the Court will reach an irrational result in 
each case of two distinct issues.  Instead, we can say for certain that whenever 
there are two distinct issues, there is the real possibility that the Court, collectively, 
will reach an irrational result.113
C. WHEN WILL IRRATIONALITY ARISE?
Obviously, though, most cases do not produce an irrational result. Thus, the 
next step in our inquiry is to determine when an irrational result will occur. 
Many commentators have tried to describe the conditions for irrationality.  
Because they did not recognize the inherently mathematical nature of the problem,  
they have inaccurately diagnosed the problem.
For example, John Rogers argues that the occurrence of irrationality requires 
a plurality and concurring opinion.  He states that an irrational decision  
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“potentially arises every time a majority is made up of (1) a plurality, and (2) a 
concurrence that refuses to adopt a necessary portion of the plurality's analysis. 
This occurs whenever there is any substantive difference in the holdings of a 
plurality decision and a concurrence.”114
This is incorrect for several reasons.  First, there need not be a plurality 
opinion in an irrational case.  For example, consider an appeal of a criminal 
conviction with two issues: 1) Was the confession coerced?  and 2) Was the search 
improper? The Defendants wins the case if she prevails on either issue:
Was the Confession 
Coerced?
Plaintiff wins  
Confession Issue
Defendant wins
Confession Issue
Plaintiff wins 
Search Issue
P wins Confession Issue
P wins Search Issue
P WINS CASE
I
D wins Confession Issue
P wins Search Issue
D WINS CASE
II
Was The Search 
Improper?
Defendant
wins  Search 
Issue
P wins Confession Issue
D wins Search Issue
D WINS CASE
III
D wins Confession Issue
D wins Search Issue
D WINS CASE
IV
Now suppose the nine justices are evenly split three ways, with three votes 
each for choices I, II, and III.  There were therefore be 6 votes for the plaintiff to 
win the confession issue [I + III] and a different 6 votes  for the plaintiff to win the 
search issue [I + II] .  Nonetheless, the defendant would win the case with 6 votes 
-49-
[II + III].  Thus, irrationality arises even without a plurality opinion. 
Secondly, Rogers’ analysis is incorrect because it omits the fact that  
irrationality requires a dissent.  If all the justices agreed on the outcome [boxes II, 
III, and IV], majorities would agree that the defendant should win the confession 
issue [II + IV], the search issue [III + IV] and the case with 6 votes [II + III + 
IV].115
Maxwell Stearns is similarly incorrect in his conclusion that the same 
conditions that lead to the cycling (or lack of transitivity) described by Condorcet 
and Arrow lead to irrational results. 116  In fact, cases with cycling need not end in 
an irrational result, and cases with irrational results need not contain cycling.
We can see a case with cycling that does not create an irrational result by 
returning to the Pentagon Papers hypothetical.117  The division between the Justices 
in that example created a “cycle” between three choices: the injunction “Violates 
Both Separation of Powers and Equal Protection”; the injunction “Violates only 
Separation of Powers but not Equal Protection”; and the injunction “Violates only  
Equal Protection but not Separation of Powers.”118 Nonetheless, because a majority 
of Justices voted that the newspaper should win on each issue [First Amendment 
and Separation of Powers] and all of the Justices voted that the newspapers should 
win the case, there was no irrational result.  Thus, the conditions that lead to 
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cycling do not necessarily lead to irrational results.
Similarly, the conditions that cause irrational results need not lead to 
cycling.  Consider this simplified version of the vote in Miller.  To make the chart 
easier to follow, I have eliminated the separation-of-powers issue and assumed that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas would vote, as they did in the subsequent case of 
Nguyen, that Miller had standing but that the law did not violate equal protection. 
Thus, they would vote the same way Justice Stevens did. In such case, the voting 
breakdown would appear as follows:
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Does Miller 
Have Standing 
To Raise Her 
Father’s 
Constitutional 
Claim?
Does Law’s 
Gender-Based 
Distinction 
Violate Equal 
Protection?
Does Miller 
Win?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
 Scalia(2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O’Connor(2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 7-2 Yes 5-2 No 6-3 
As in the actual case, this is an irrational result, because Miller prevailed on 
all relevant issues but lost the case.  It is not, however, inevitable, that the opinions 
in this case represent the sort of cycling, or lack of transitivity, described by 
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Kenneth Arrow.  To see why, it is necessary to examine the preference order for 
each group of Justices. 
There are four possibilities among which the Justices can choose:
I. Standing and Equal Protection Violation;
II. No Standing and Equal Protection Violation;
III.  Standing and No Equal Protection Violation; and 
IV. No Standing and No Equal Protection Violation.  
Because no Justice detailed a full preference order for all four options, I will 
make some guesses as to what they would be. First, since each opinion revealed a 
preference for one combination, it is certainly plausible to assume that  the 
opposite combination may have been the least preferred of the author.  Second, if 
we assume that, for ranking second and third-choice preferences, each of the 
Justices cared more about their preferred views on equal protection than on 
standing, the preference order chart can be completed as follows:
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Stevens, 
Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Thomas
[4 votes]
O’Connor, 
Kennedy
[2 votes]
Breyer, Souter, 
Ginsburg
[3 votes]
1 Standing, Not 
Violate Equal 
Pro
No Standing, 
Violates
Equal Pro
Standing,  
Violates 
Equal Pro
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
2 No Standing, 
Not Violate 
Equal Pro
Standing,  
Violates 
Equal Pro
No Standing, 
Violates
Equal Pro
3 Standing,  
Violates 
Equal Pro
No Standing, 
Not Violate 
Equal Pro
Standing, Not 
Violate Equal 
Pro
4 No Standing, 
Violates
Equal Pro
Standing, Not 
Violate Equal 
Pro
No Standing , 
Not Violate 
Equal Pro
There is no cycling, or lack of transitivity, in this case because one choice, 
“Standing and Violates Equal Protection” [in bold],  prevails over all three 
remaining options in head-to-head votes.  Five Justices [the groups represented by 
Breyer and O’Connor] prefer “Standing and Violates Equal Protection” to either 
“Standing and Not Violate Equal Protection” or “No Standing and Not Violate 
Equal Protection”.  Seven Justices [the groups represented by Breyer and Stevens ] 
prefer “Standing and Violates Equal Protection” to either “No Standing and 
Violates Equal Protection.”  Thus, Standing and Equal Protection Violation, is the 
Condorcet winner.119
There is no cycling, despite the fact that the voting pattern resulted in an 
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irrational decision.  Thus, we have seen that irrational results can arise even under 
conditions that do not lead to cycling.  Since we have also seen that cycling can 
occur without an irrational opinion, we can conclude that the same conditions do 
not lead to both cycling and irrational opinions.
In order to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for an irrational 
decision to occur, we must look at the voting breakdowns which lead one party 
being a loser on every issue but winning the case anyway.    If there were only one 
issue, no rational Justice could vote in favor of one party on the issue, but not on 
winning the case. Thus, there must be at least two distinct issues.120  Next, there 
must be no majority opinion, since the rational reasoning of the majority opinion 
would preclude an irrational result. Because there is no majority opinion, assuming 
all the Justices are voting, the Court  must divide among at least three opinions 
containing at least three different voting  permutations. 
The key to understanding how those votes must be divided to create an 
irrational opinion is the critical observation that when there are two issues the same 
party wins the case by winning either of the split votes.121  Combined with the 
more self-evident point that a different party wins the case for each of the two 
unified votes, we can see that one party will win the case by prevailing on either of 
the split votes or one of the unified votes.
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To see how that will lead to a discovery of the conditions for creating 
irrational opinions, we can look at a chart showing two distinct issues. Assume that 
the parties are the Defendant and the Plaintiff and that the Defendant is the party 
who wins the case if there is a split vote.122 The chart of the voting possibilities 
would then be as follows:
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue A
Defendant wins
Issue A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue B
P wins A
P wins B
P WINS CASE
I
D wins A
P wins B
D WINS CASE
II
ISSUE B Defendant wins 
Issue B
P wins A
D wins B
D WINS CASE
III
D wins A
D wins B
D WINS CASE
IV
In our example, an irrational result is only obtained if the Defendant wins 
the case, but the Plaintiff receives a majority vote on each issue. An irrational 
result cannot be obtained in the reverse way, meaning that for our scenario, the 
Defendant wins on each issue but the Plaintiff wins the case.  This is because the 
only voting permutation under which the Plaintiff wins is by winning both issues.  
Thus, the only way for the Plaintiff to win is by having a majority of Justices vote 
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that she wins on both issues [permutation I]. If that were to happen, the Plaintiff 
would both win on each issue and win the case, so there would not be an irrational 
result.  Thus, were an irrational opinion to arise from this fact pattern, it must be 
the Plaintiff who receives a majority vote on each issue while the Defendant wins 
the case.
The Plaintiff wins on issue A only if adding the number of votes in the left  
hand column [I + III] equal a majority.  Similarly, the Plaintiff wins on issue B 
only if adding the number of votes in the top row [I + II] equal a majority.  More 
generally, the party who must win on both issues in order to win the case will win 
on each issue only if the sums from adding the votes for his only winning 
permutation separately to each of the split decisions separately total a majority.
The Defendant wins the case by either winning one of the split votes [II or 
III] or the unified vote for which he wins both of the issues [IV]. Thus, the 
Defendant also wins the case if the sum of the votes in all three permutations is a 
majority, if the votes in  II + III + IV yield a majority of the votes cast. In more 
general terms, if the sum of the number who select the split votes added to the 
number who chose the unified vote which leads to the same result total a majority, 
the party who wins the case when there are split votes wins the case.
We can now see the requirements for an irrational opinion.  One party, the 
-56-
party who needs to win on both issues in order to win the case, must win each issue 
by having the sums from adding the votes for his only winning permutation 
separately to each of the split decisions separately total a majority. The other party 
would win the case if the sum of Justices voting who select the split votes plus the 
unified vote which leads to his victory total a majority.123
Thus, the Court reaches an irrational result if the following occur:
1. There are two distinct issues;
2. There is no majority opinion; and 
3. The votes of the Justices are divided in such a way that:
a. The combined votes for all of the winning permutations for which the 
party who prevails for a split decision total at least a majority {so that he wins the 
case}; and 
b. The sums obtained from adding the votes for the one winning permutation 
for the other party separately to each of the split decisions total at least a majority 
{so that she wins on each issue}.124
From these requirements it further follows that if there is an irrational 
opinion, the only party who can win is the one who prevails when there is a split 
vote. In addition, there must be at least one dissenting vote for the losing party’s 
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unified vote permutation.  There also must be at least one vote for each split vote 
permutation.125
D. THE IRRATIONALITY THEOREM IN ACTION
In the past 60 years, the Supreme Court has issued numerous irrational 
decisions, in addition to Miller v. Albright.126 In the interest of brevity, I will 
discuss one recent such case, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,127 in detail, and 
summarize the others in the appendix. 
Eastern Enterprises involved a challenge to the retroactive application of the 
Coal Act.128  Pursuant to the Coal Act, which was enacted in 1992, Eastern 
Enterprises, a company that had sold its coal producing business in 1965, was 
required to pay at least 50 million dollars for the health benefits of former 
employees.129  There were two main issues in the case: 1) Did the retroactive 
application of the Coal Act constitute a “takings” in violation of the Takings 
Clause of the 5th Amendment130; and 2) Did the retroactive application of the Coal 
Act violate the Due Process Clause? 
There were three main opinions in the case.  Justice O’Connor wrote the 
plurality opinion for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and 
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Thomas, finding the Coal Act unconstitutional.   Her opinion stated that the Coal 
Act violated the Takings Clause, because it required Eastern Enterprises to bear the 
substantial expense of, “lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities 
decades before those benefits were promised.”131  While not definitively deciding 
the Due Process question, the opinion expressed strong, “concerns about using the 
Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation.”132
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion on behalf of himself alone.  He stated that 
the Takings Clause was not violated by the Coal Act because it did not, “affect an 
obligation relating to a specific property interest.”133  Nonetheless, he stated the 
Coal Act was unconstitutional as violative of “due process restrictions against
severe retroactive legislation.”134
Finally, Justice Breyer wrote a dissent for himself and Justices Ginsburg, 
Stevens, and Souter.  This opinion declared that the Coal Act was constitutional.  
Breyer agreed with Kennedy that the Takings Clause did not apply because the 
Coal Act did not affect “an interest in physical or intellectual property, but 
[imposed] an ordinary liability to pay money.”135  Breyer also found that Coal Act 
did not violated the Due Process Clause because it was not “ fundamentally unfair” 
to impose liability, especially when Eastern Enterprises had, “until 1987, continued 
to draw sizable profits from the coal industry though a wholly owned 
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subsidiary.”136
By putting the votes of the different Justices in chart form, we can see the 
extraordinary result: A majority of the Justices voted against Eastern Enterprises 
on both of the relevant issues, yet the company won the case. 137  The following 
chart summarizes the reasoning and conclusion of each opinion in Eastern 
Enterprises:
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Does the Takings 
Clause Apply To 
Imposition Of 
Retroactive 
Liability by the 
Coal Act?
Does the 
Retroactive 
Aspect of the 
Coal Act Violate 
Substantive Due 
Process?
Does Eastern 
Enterprise Win?
O’Connor(4) Yes (4) No (4) Yes (4)
Kennedy (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Breyer (4) No (4) No (4) No (4)
TOTAL No 5-4 No 8-1 Yes 5-4 
Logic would indicate that if the only basis on which the Coal Act is 
challenged is the claim that it violates the Takings Clause and the Due Process 
Clause, and the law violates neither, it must be constitutional.  Nonetheless, the 
aggregation of the differing opinions leads to the irrational result that the Court 
concludes the Coal Act is unconstitutional, even though a majority [albeit a
different majority] of the Justices find it passes constitutional muster under each of 
the challenged provisions.
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The consequences which have flowed from the  Eastern’s irrationality have 
been more troubling than from Miller. It is indeed an understatement, as one Court 
of Appeals noted, that, “[t]he splintered nature of the Court makes it difficult to 
distill a guiding principle....”138
Several courts have held that because there were five votes against finding a 
Takings Clause violation unless the Government action affected a specific property 
interest, the case “makes clear that plaintiffs must first establish an independent 
property right before they can argue that the state has taken that right without just 
compensation.”139   Other courts have “assumed,” the opposite,  that the plurality's 
view that an extreme retroactive law can violate the Takings Clause simply be 
requiring a large payment, “is entitled to some persuasive precedential effect....”140
Further, courts have split over whether Eastern Enterprises changed or 
reaffirmed the way of analyzing whether retroactive laws violate substantive due 
process.  Some have concluded that there is a new, stricter test for retroactive laws: 
“To the extent that Eastern embodies principles capable of broader application, we 
believe that due process analysis encompasses the relevant concerns....Instead of 
relying solely on the length of the retroactivity, we assess the relationship of the 
retroactively imposed liability to the governmental interests asserted in its 
defense.”141  Other courts have viewed Eastern Enterprises in a diametrically 
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opposed manner, as confirming a reluctance to utilized the due process clause in 
such circumstances: “[W]e take seriously the Eastern Enterprises plurality's 
cautionary words about employing the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic 
legislation...”142
Thus, the irrational decision of Eastern Enterprises, not surprisingly,  has 
left an incoherent muddle in its wake. The next question is how should our legal 
system deal with irrational opinions.
IV. What Should be Done about Irrational Decisions?
The mathematical inevitability of irrational decisions has led to various 
schemes for preventing individual irrational decisions from arising.  Unfortunately, 
in each case, the proposed cure is worse than the ailment.
A. Bush v Gore: A Case of Disingenuous Voting?
One way to avoid an irrational result if it one or more Justices change their 
vote so that the results of votes on the individual issues is consistent with the result 
of the case.143 Before discussing whether Justices should change votes, I will 
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examine a surprising instance where some Justices may secretly have done just 
that.
It is entirely possible that a fear of creating an irrational opinion contributed 
to the unusual alignment of votes in the case which marked the end of the disputed 
2000 presidential election,   Bush v. Gore.144  In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court 
was faced with three issues involving the Florida Supreme Court’s order for a 
manual recount of disputed ballots: 1) Whether the Florida Supreme Court 
established new standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby 
violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution ; 2) Whether the use of 
“standardless” manual recounts violated the Equal Protection Clause; and 3) If 
there were an Equal Protection violation, did the “safe-harbor” date provided in the 
federal election statute preclude the possibility of a constitutional recount.  In order 
to stop the recount, the Court needed to rule “yes” on either a) question one, or b) 
both questions two and three.
In a per curiam opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, and Kennedy, the Court ruled that the recount ordered 
by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause, because it 
failed to “satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters.”  
According to the per curiam opinion, the Florida recount would have been 
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conducted by various local election boards determining the validity of the ballots 
absent “specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment.”  Because different 
boards would likely use different standards, a ballot that was counted as valid in 
one county might well be considered invalid elsewhere.  By permitting this 
differential treatment, stated the per curiam opinion, the Florida Supreme Court 
violated, “its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members 
of its electorate.”  Because it concluded that there was not time for a revised 
recount before the  so-called “safe-harbor” date provided in the federal election 
statute, the per curiam opinion concluded that no recount could be held.
The per curiam opinion did not address the merits of Article II claim, that 
the Florida Supreme Court had impermissibly established new standards for 
resolving Presidential election contests.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, wrote a 
concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.  While stressing that 
they “join the per curiam opinion,” they added that the Article II claim provided 
“additional grounds that require us to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's 
decision.”  
There were four dissenting Justices, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Souter.  All four found no violation of Article II.  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
also found no violation of equal protection.  Justices Breyer and Souter did find 
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that the differential counting of ballots violated the equal protection clause, but 
both concluded that there was sufficient time for an appropriate recount.
Of all of the mysteries surrounding the Bush v Gore decision, one of  the 
more provocative is why the three concurring Justices signed onto the per curium
equal protection analysis, when it seems to be the sort of analysis they would 
normally oppose.145   After all, these are not Justices with a reputation for utilizing 
an expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause.146
As Justice Thomas wrote in a dissent to the 1996 case of M.L.B. v. S.L.J.147, 
an opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia:  “[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause shields only against purposeful discrimination.”148  Thus, 
it is surprising to see these same three Justices put there names on the per curium 
opinion which apparently uses a heightened form of scrutiny despite the fact that 
no particular group in the case was subject to either intentional discrimination or 
inevitable harm.149
In addition, the standard announced in the per curium opinion, was not one 
of the traditional ones used by the Court.150 In fact, the standard that government 
must “avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate,” had 
never been utilized previously by the Court in a voting rights case.151   The three 
concurring Justices have often displayed downright hostility for what they term 
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“newly minted” standards.152  Nonetheless, there was no a word of criticism from 
the three that the per curium opinion had created and applied such a newly minted 
standard.
The mystery, then, is why the three signed onto the per curium opinion if it 
contained constitutional analysis which they would normally oppose vigorously. 
The mystery is heightened by the fact that the same ultimate result would have 
been reached even had they not signed onto the reasoning of the per curium 
opinion. As stated earlier, in order to reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme 
Court and end the recounting process, it would have been sufficient to use either 
the Equal Protection Clause or Art. II, §  1, cl. 2.  Thus, if the three who signed the 
concurring opinion had voted for the judgement of reversing the Florida court, but 
done so solely on the Art. II, §  1, cl. 2 rationale described in their opinion, the 
result of the case would have been the same: five votes to end the recount 
immediately.  
The solution to the mystery may be that Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas feared that taking such a path would have led to a perception that the 
President of the United States had been “selected” by an irrational decision.   
Indeed, an irrational decision would have arisen had the other two Justices who 
signed the per curium opinion, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, explicitly rejected 
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their Article II argument.153 Such a rejection is far from fanciful.  Not only is 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor disagreement implicit in the silence of the per 
curium opinion on that issue, reporters covering the Supreme Court disclosed that 
the two Justices refused to sign an opinion drafted by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
which focused on the Article II claim.154
Thus, if Justices Kennedy and O'Connor supported the Equal Protection 
claim and rejected the Article II claim, while Justices  Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas  supported the Article II claim but rejected the Equal Protection argument, 
the result would have been the classic irrational decision: a majority voting in favor 
of respondent Gore on every relevant issue, yet the Court ruling in favor of 
petitioner Bush. The following chart reveals this alternative result:155
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Did the Florida 
Supreme Court 
Establish New  
Election 
Standards in
Violation of Art. 
II?
Did the Use of  
“Standardless” 
Recounts Violate 
Equal 
Protection?
Should Recount 
be Stopped?
O’Connor + 
Kennedy (2) 
 No (2) Yes  (2) Yes  (2)
Rehnquist (3) Yes  (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Breyer (2)  No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Stevens (2)  No (2)  No (2)  No (2)
TOTAL No 6-3 No 5-4 Yes 6-3 
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Considering the outcry at the decision as written, one can only imagine the 
ridicule the Court would have endured had it issued a demonstrably irrational 
opinion.156  Thus, it is certainly a plausible solution to our mystery to conclude that, 
perhaps, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas chose what they saw as the lesser of 
two evils: signing onto an equal protection analysis with which they did not fully 
agree rather than issue an irrational decision to resolve the most politically volatile 
case in at least half a century. 
The above interpretation of Bush v Gore illustrates one way to avoid irrational 
decisions: Justices can mask their true views and sign onto an opinion with whose 
conclusion on a particular issue they disagree.   It would certainly be problematic, 
however, for the Court to adopt a practice of Justices secretly voting against their 
conscience on a particular issue in order to prevent an irrational decision.
It is of fundamental importance that Justices be honest about their reasoning.  
As one federal district judge has declared: “The requirement that the judiciary be 
candid is perhaps absolute.”157
The [hopefully] most obvious reason for this requirement is that there is a 
“moral obligation of candor”.158  One should not need string cites to establish that 
Justices should not try to deceive the readers of their opinions.
There are also numerous pragmatic reasons why Justices should not pretend to 
hold different opinions than they do in reality. Firstly, candor promotes “the public 
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accountability of judges and to stimulate judicial reflection and self-control.”159  One 
of the main benefits of published opinions is that they prevent Justices from basing 
decisions on “unprincipled” grounds.160 In the words of Professor Deborah Hellman: 
“ Candor thus acts as a prophylactic; the requirement of publicity insures that the 
reasons on which decisions are based are at least minimally acceptable to the 
public.... [Publicity] will prevent the judge from endorsing views that others perceive 
as wildly illegitimate.”161
A second pragmatic argument against judicial subterfuge is that such  
deception is bound to be revealed, or at least suspected, sooner or later. 162 The belief 
that Justices have not been honest in their published opinions, “destroys their 
credibility.”163
Additionally, such a disingenuous vote creates a misleading precedent.  Taking 
the Bush v Gore interpretation as an example, imagine the dilemma facing a lower 
court the next time there is an equal protection challenge to a recount decision.  
Technically, lower courts must follow the teaching of the majority’s  per curiam
opinion, and utilize its novel standard that to be constitutional a state must, “avoid 
arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate.”164  When that 
lower court is reviewed, though, that standard might be rejected by the same Court 
that announced it. If indeed Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas did not truly 
agree with the per curium’s equal protection analysis, they might well vote with 
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Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and return to the traditional lower equal protection 
standard of rational review.  We would then have the unfortunate irony of an unequal 
application of the equal protection clause.
B. The Limits of Disclosed Vote Switching
Some of these problems might be mitigated were a Justice to declare openly 
that, despite an individual determination of the relevant issues that lead to one party 
winning the case, he or she was voting for a judgement in which the other party 
prevails.  Similar candor has been seen in several instances where a Justice switched 
his or her vote to produce a majority judgment in a case which  presented three 
possible judgments -- affirmance, reversal, or remand -- and none would have 
otherwise received a majority vote.165
But Justices can also “switch votes” to prevent the Court’s opinion from being 
irrational.166  Consider the case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.167
There were two issues in that case: 1) Did Congress intend the Superfund law to 
permit private suits against the states for damages; and 2) Does Congress have the 
power, under the Commerce Clause to permit such suits? Union Gas needed a 
positive answer to both of these questions to win the case.  Indeed, a majority of 
Justices found that Congress did intend the law to permit such private suits, and a 
different majority found that Congress had the requisite power.  However, there were 
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five different Justices who individually believed either that Congress did not intend 
the law to permit such private suits, or that Congress did not have the power to do so. 
Because either view would lead to Pennsylvania winning the case, had all the Justices 
voted for a judgement consistent with their individual reasoning an irrational result 
would have occurred: Union Gas would have prevailed on every issue, but 
Pennsylvania would have won the case.168
Justice White, though, stated that despite the fact that he believed Congress did 
not intend the law to permit such private suits, he would defer to the majority who 
voted that it did.169  Thus, because White believed that Congress would have the 
Constitutional authority to pass such a law, he “switched sides” and voted with four 
other Justices that Union Gas should win the case.   Accordingly, there was a 
majority vote in favor of Union Gas. White’s switch averted an irrational result, since 
now Union Gas prevailed on every issue and also won the case.170
Including Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, there have been only three cases, where 
a Justice switched votes and prevented the Court from issuing an irrational opinion.171
Doubtlessly, such a switch has the virtue of ensuring that there is a “rational” result in 
a particular case, and helps create clear holdings on the underlying issues of the 
case.172
Nonetheless, there are several problems with Justices engaging in such vote-
switching.  Firstly, the Justice who switches votes to prevent a collective irrational 
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result, will, by that very act, be guilty of irrational reasoning.173  Thus, Justice White, 
in Union Gas, ended up declaring, in effect, both that Congress did not intend the 
Superfund law to permit private suits against the states for damages but that 
Pennsylvania could still be sued under the Superfund law.
A second problem is that the vote-switching Justice effectively controls the 
outcome of the case unilaterally. This is not the same as a “swing” Justice, who 
affects the outcome of a case when his or her determination of the appropriate 
disposition of a particular issue coincides with one group of Justices or another.174
Rather, vote switching permits one Justice to control the outcome by the individual 
selection of one voting procedure or another.  As Professors Kornhauser & Sager 
note, such procedural decisions “ought to be a matter of articulate and reflective 
practice, not the private impulse of each Justice.” 175
Finally, there is no obvious principle for when a Justice should switch votes.  It 
has been suggested that in the few vote-switching cases, individual Justices were 
motivated by the “ precedential importance” of the issue which became the Court’s 
holding due to their vote.176  Not only is it improper for a single Justice to manipulate 
voting procedures to reach a personally desired outcome, such a practice could easily 
lead to retaliatory vote switching to defeat the scheme.177  For example, in Union 
Gas, Justice Scalia voted that Congress did intend the law to permit such private 
suits, but that Congress lacked the requisite Constitutional power.  If Justice Scalia 
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cared more about the constitutional than the statutory issue, and had felt that Justice 
White was inappropriately “gaming the system,” he could have altered his vote to 
find that Congress, in fact, did not intend the law to permit private suits.  This second  
vote-switch would create a majority for the proposition that there was no statutory 
authority for the suit, and the Court would thus not reach the constitutional issue.  We 
should not welcome a system that permits, let alone encourages, such unprincipled 
machinations.178
C. The Futility of Changing Voting Protocols
Some scholars have argued that the problem of group irrationality should be 
dealt with by having the Justices decide cases by voting directly on the individual 
issues in each case, rather than on merely the outcome.179  Using the terminology of 
David Post and Steven Salop, they would prefer that Justices use “issue voting,” 
rather than the current system of “outcome voting.”180
One advantage of issue voting is that when there is a case involving collective 
irrationality, the Court will still be able to produce usable precedent.  For example, if 
the Court in Miller had voted by issue, there would have been a clear-cut 7-2 majority 
for finding standing, at least a 5-2 majority for finding that the Court have the power 
to grant the relief requested, and a [probable] majority of at least 5-2 in favor of 
striking down the distinction as unconstitutional sex-based discrimination.   These 
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three holdings would then be treated as “usable precedents,” for lower courts as well 
as future Supreme Court decisions.
There are several problems with issue voting, however.  One is that the 
definition of what is an “issue” is often not self-evident.  Frequently, there will be 
more than one way to define the relevant issues, and to define the “sub-issues” that 
need to be addressed.181  For example, the question of whether a statute should be 
interpreted in a way which leads to a particular party winning a case might be 
subdivided into narrower questions of whether a) the plain language of the statute or 
(b) whether the statute’s legislative history mandate an interpretation favorable to that 
party.182
A second problem with issue-voting is that it would not prevent the problem of 
thwarting the will of a majority of the Court.  Specifically, in Miller, a majority of the 
Justices believed that the plaintiff should lose her law suit, yet under issue-voting, the 
Court would have been forced to declare her the winner.  In fact, issue voting can 
lead to a situation where not only is the will of the majority thwarted, the will of 
every single voting Justice is frustrated.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical of an American citizen, captured in 
Afghanistan, who is held without a hearing as an enemy combatant.183  Assume that 
in order for the Government to prevail, Congress must have authorized the detention.  
Next, assume that the Government has declared that it will have to release the 
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detainee if ordered to hold a hearing, because such a hearing would require the 
disclosure of material harmful to national security.   Thus, in order for the 
Government to continue to hold the detainee, the Court must find that when Congress 
authorizes a detention, no Due Process hearing is required.  Finally, in order to 
continue holding the detainee, the Government must show that the detention does not 
violate the Geneva Convention. 
Now, assume that the Court is divided into three camps.  Justice O’Connor 
[representing herself and Justices Rhenquist, Kennedy, and Breyer] votes:
1) That Congress authorized the detention;
2) That when Congress authorizes a detention, a Due Process hearing is required; and
3) That detention does not violate the Geneva Convention. 
Thus, four Justices vote that the detainee must be released because a hearing 
before a neutral forum must be held for the detention to be valid.
Next, assume that Justice Scalia [representing himself and Justices Stevens and 
Thomas] votes :
1) That Congress did not authorize the detention;
2) That when Congress does authorizes a detention, a Due Process hearing is not 
required; and
3) That the detention does not violate the Geneva Convention. 
Thus, because they concluded that Congress did not authorize the detention, 
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these three Justices vote that the detainee must be released.
Finally, assume that Justice Souter [representing himself and Justice Ginsburg] 
votes: 
1) That Congress did authorize the detention;
2) That when Congress does authorizes a detention, a Due Process hearing is not 
required; and
3) That the detention does violate the Geneva Convention. 
Thus, because they concluded that the detention does violate the Geneva 
Convention, these two Justices vote that the detainee must be released.
In our current system of outcome voting, as all of the Justices find that the 
detention is unlawful, the detainee must be released. 
If the Court utilized issue-voting, though, the case would turn out very 
differently. A majority of Justices would have found for the Government on each 
issue:
1) Congress authorizes the detention O’Connor (4) + Souter (2) = 6 votes
2) A Due Process hearing is not required Scalia (3) + Souter (2) = 5 votes
3) The detention does not violate the Geneva Convention O’Connor (4) + Scalia  (3) = 7 votes 
In a system utilizing issue voting, the Government would win the case because 
it prevailed on each issue.  This would lead to the remarkable situation where the 
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detainee who brought the case would remain in detention, despite the fact that every 
single Justice believed he should be released. If we were not to term such a result 
irrational, we would certainly have to term it unjust.184
The reason that both the traditional outcome voting and the alternative issue 
voting both can create such illogical and arguably unjust results is that, under either 
regimen,  a disconnect can arise between the group’s collective reasoning [as 
reflected by majority vote on individual issues] and the group’s collective result [as 
reflected in its majority vote on the result].  It is not the voting protocol that causes 
the problem but the very nature of collective decision-making. Faced with this 
inevitability, we are called upon to consider what techniques can best ameliorate the 
problem.
Some commentators have put forth more complex voting protocols.  For 
example, Professors Kornhauser and Sage proposed the use of “metavote”185 Under 
their plan, Justices faced with an irrational decision would vote on whether to use 
issue voting or outcome voting for that particular case.  The primary advantage to 
such a system is that the Justices would decide together which was more important to 
preserve in that case: the judgment or the resolution of the issues.186
There are several problems with the metavote proposal.  First, the same 
divisions within the Court which caused the irrationality will frequently render the 
metavote meaningless.  To return to our discussion of Eastern Enterprises, it would 
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be surprising if the Justices who were troubled enough by the retroactive application 
of the Coal Act to vote that it was unconstitutional, would opt during a “metavote” 
for issue voting, which would not only permit the Act to stand but would create 
holdings that such retroactivity did not offend either the Takings Clause and the Due 
Process Clause.
Additionally, as Professor Jonathan Nash pointed out, because there are 
multiple factors to consider during a metavote, the metavote could lead to an 
irrational result.187 In other words, a series of votes could lead to a [different] 
majority voting that every factor for outcome voting had been met but that another 
majority also voted for the result of issue voting. Thus, the metavote is subject to the 
same dangers as the current system.
Nash has proposed an even more complicated hybrid system. Nash attempts to 
draw a “bright line” between what he terms a “pure question of law” and an 
“application of law to fact.”188 At the risk of over-simplifying his proposal, Nash 
suggests that outcome-based voting be used to establish the appropriate legal 
standard governing a particular cause of action, and then each application of law to 
fact under that standard would be determined separately, using issue-based voting.189
If there is a disagreement in the Court over which voting protocol to use, a “true 
metavote may be required to resolve the controversy.”190
There are many problems with this proposal as well.  First, the line between a 
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“pure question of law” and an “application of law to fact” is not especially bright. 
Remember that one of the issues in Miller v. Albright, was whether Equal Protection 
was violated by a Federal law which imposed different rules for obtaining citizenship 
for illegitimate children who had only one American citizen parent, depending on the 
sex of the citizen parent. Justice Stevens, stated that such distinctions are 
constitutional, because they meet the standard that “normally governs gender 
discrimination,” which he describes as “substantially related to important 
governmental objectives”. 191 He cites for support of this standard United States v. 
Virginia.192  By contrast, Justice Breyer, citing the same case, stated that the law 
violated equal protection because it lacked, “the ‘exceedingly persuasive’ support 
that the Constitution requires.”193  It is not self-evident whether the issue of whether 
the law violates Equal Protection is a “pure question of law” – determining the 
appropriate standard for judging gender discrimination cases – or an “application of 
law to fact” – applying an agreed upon standard to the facts of the case.194
It is not even clear that there would be agreement as to what are the issues 
being voted upon.  Nash states that the Supreme Court's opinion in Apodaca v. 
Oregon,195 “ultimately raised only a single issue of pure law - whether the 
Constitution requires a unanimous jury verdict for a criminal conviction to stand in 
state court.” 196 By contrast, every Justice voting in the case saw that the question 
required the resolution of two distinct issues [or subissues]: 1) Whether the same 
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standard applies to state as to federal criminal trials; and 2) Whether a unanimous 
jury was required in federal criminal trials.197
Finally, one would not expect any court, let alone the Supreme Court, to  adopt 
a voting protocol as complicated as that proposed by Jonathan Nash. Especially since 
there would still be irrational decisions under even that plan,198it is unlikely that 
courts will turn to this proposal to resolve the problem of irrational decisions.  
Thus, while there are benefits to each proposed change in voting protocol, they 
are not the solution to the problem of irrational decisions.  The problem which results 
from the very structure of judicial decision-making, then, is destined to remain.
D. Irrational Solutions 
1. Tinkering Around the Edges
Even though it is impossible to eliminate irrational opinions, there are certain 
steps that can be taken at the margins to make things better.  One step that would help 
would be if the Justices who saw that an irrational opinion was looming, decided to 
avoid discussing issues that were logically unnecessary for them to decide when 
reaching their own decision.  In Miller v. Albright, for example, once Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy had decided that the plaintiff lacked standing, their vote was 
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going to be that she lose the case.   There was no need for them to discuss the merits 
of the sex discrimination claim.199  The five votes in her favor on the merits of her 
claim could not be considered a “holding” because the plaintiff lost the case.  In fact, 
as it turned out, the Court eventually reached the opposite conclusion on the sex 
discrimination claim.  Thus, had O’Connor and Kennedy not discussed that claim in 
Miller, there would have been no change in the result of the case [the plaintiff still 
would have lost], and no change in the substantive law [since no “holding” was 
created in Miller].  There would, however, not have been an irrational opinion, since 
there would not have been the enough votes on all the relevant issues to create a 
majority in the plaintiff’s behalf on all of those issues.  Had they not voiced their 
opinion unnecessarily, there would not have been an irrational Court decision.  Put 
differently, when dealing with irrational opinions, “The better part of valor is 
discretion.”200
Another suggestion for dealing with irrational opinions focuses on those issued 
by lower-level appellate courts. John Nash proposes that the Supreme Court should 
be especially willing to accept a petition for certiorari so it can review irrational 
opinions by lower appellate courts.201 Indeed, it would certainly be beneficial if a 
higher court could eliminate the inevitable confusion sowed by irrational opinion. 
That, of course, does not deal with the Supreme Court’s own irrational opinions.
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2. Living with Irrationality
Ultimately, we must face the reality that as long as we utilize multi-member 
courts, it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of irrational appellate opinions.  
Rather than rail at the dilemma wrought by the imperfections of our system, though, 
we should recognize that these imperfections are simply part of the inherent 
limitations of humanity. Law is certainly not the only intellectual discipline to 
confront such limitations. 
For example, chaos theory is based on the realization that there are certain 
relatively basic systems in biology, physics, and mathematics for which long-range 
prediction is impossible.202  The difficulties posed by chaos theory can be illustrated 
by the calculation of the population density of a tiny insect which increases when 
food is plentiful but decreases during times of overcrowding. Because of a 
phenomena known as “sensitive dependence on initial conditions,”203 even the 
slightest errors in calculating the starting density will, over time, lead to 
extraordinarily erroneous results. Moreover, any change along the way will render 
the initial prediction meaningless. This is sometimes termed the “butterfly effect,”  
because an act as seemingly insignificant as a butterfly flapping its wings can change 
the weather around the world (though of course, we can never know in what way).204
The humbling lesson of chaos theory is that such systems are destined to 
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remain unpredictable. As one theorist noted: “We cannot blame this failure on the 
influence of unknown factors, because there are none.  It is rather the result of our 
own terminal inability to measure or represent the present with infinite precision.”205
A similarly humbling experience can be derived from an examination of the 
famous Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle from quantum physics.206  In simple terms, 
Werner Heisenberg discovered in 1927 that it was impossible to determine precisely 
both the position and the momentum of a subatomic particle, such as an electron, 
because the light needed to identify the position of the particle will alter its 
momentum.207 Thus, we can say that the more we know about the particle’s position, 
the less we know about its momentum.208  Since one needs to know both the position 
and momentum of a particle to determine where it will be in the future, the 
Uncertainty Principle means that we can never predict precisely the future location of 
these particles.  As Steven Hawking wrote: “[O]ne certainly cannot predict future 
events exactly if one cannot even measure the present state of the universe 
precisely.”209 Once again, this is not a result of a failure of human effort but a 
limitation imposed by nature.210
A final example of such limitations is Kurt Gödel’s “Incompleteness 
Theorem.”211   In 1928, David Hilbert, one of the leading mathematician of the 20th 
Century, issued a challenge to the mathematical community.  He wanted someone to 
create a “complete” formal logical system, one that would be able to prove or 
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disprove any mathematical hypothesis. Two years later, Gödel, announced an 
unexpected end to the challenge.  Gödel had proven that no such system could ever 
be created, that within any system of the kind envisioned by Hilbert, there would 
always be true mathematical statements that were unprovable.212  Such systems were 
fated to be “incomplete.” There is no amount of effort which will eliminate this 
incompleteness.  In the words of mathematician Rudy Rucker, “Our world is 
endlessly more complicated than any finite program or any finite set of rules.”213
The same limitations on perfectability that are seen in chaos theory,
the Uncertainty Principle, and the Incompleteness Theorem, are inherent in irrational 
opinions.  Whenever a group makes a decision based on the individual members’ 
assessment of multiple issues, there exists the possibility that the group will issue an 
irrational opinion.  However, just as chaos theory, the Uncertainty Principle, and the 
Incompleteness Theorem do not prevent scientists and mathematicians from making 
important discoveries and solving difficult problems, neither will irrational opinions 
prevent our courts from resolving most cases rationally. 
When an irrational opinion does arise, then, we can simply view it as a lesson 
in human limitations, a particularly important lesson for judges and lawyers. In the 
words of Imre Lakatos, a philosopher of science. “Why not honestly admit .... 
fallibility, and try to defend the dignity of fallible knowledge from cynical 
scepticism, rather than delude ourselves that we can invisibly mend the latest tear in 
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the fabric of our ‘ultimate’ intuitions?”214
V. CONCLUSION
The key to understanding truly irrational court opinions is to recognize the 
confounding aspects of group decision-making.  As one commentator noted:  “[A]n 
analyst errs in treating appellate court decisions ‘as if they were the act of a single 
judge.’”215
Nonetheless, not every problem that afflicts group decision-making in theory 
will be relevant to our judicial system.  Thus, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem will 
not be a serious source of problem for our Courts.
By contrast, we cannot escape the possibility of the irrationality opinion in 
which of a majority of Justices vote that one party prevails on all relevant issues but 
still loses the case. Such irrational opinions have been issued before, and will surely 
be delivered again.  They will stand as testaments to the inevitable imperfections of 
human endeavors, including our judicial system.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL IRRATIONAL CASES
1. Kovacs v. Cooper , 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
A majority of the Justices voted that a state ban of all use of sound violated the 
First Amendment.  A different majority voted that the New Jersey law in question did 
ban all sound trucks.  Nonetheless, the Court found the law constitutional.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Does a State Ban
on all Sound 
Trucks Violate the 
First Amendment?
Does the N.J. Law 
Ban All Sound 
Trucks? 
Does the N.J. Law 
Violate the First 
Amendment?
Reed (3) Yes (3) No (3) No (3)
Frankfurter (1) No (1) Not Say  (1) No (1)
Jackson (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Black (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 6-2 Yes 4-3 No 5-3 
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2. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co. , 337 U.S. 582 (1949)
Congress passed a law vesting federal district courts with diversity jurisdiction 
over suits between citizens of States and the District of Columbia.  The only two 
possible constitutional bases for this law were Article I and III.  A majority of the 
Justices voted that Article I did not give Congress this power, and a different majority 
voted that Article III did not give Congress this power. Nonetheless, a majority of the 
Court voted that voted that Congress did have this power.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Does Art I permit 
Congress to vest 
diversity jurisdiction 
over suits between 
citizens of States and 
the District of 
Columbia?
Does Art III permit 
Congress to vest 
diversity jurisdiction 
over suits between 
citizens of States and 
the District of 
Columbia?
Can  Congress to vest 
diversity jurisdiction 
over suits between 
citizens of States and 
the District of 
Columbia?
Jackson  (3) Yes (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Rutledge (2) No (2) Yes (2) Yes (2)
Vinson  (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
Frankfurter (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
TOTAL No  6-3 No 6-3 Yes 5-4 
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3. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)
A defendant was challenging his conviction for willful failure to pay taxes on 
funds which he had acquired through illegal embezzlement.  A majority of Justices 
voted that embezzled funds must be treated as taxable income, and a different 
majority voted that the defendant willfully failed to pay taxes on those funds.  
Nonetheless, the Court voted that the defendant could not be tried for willfully failing 
to pay taxes on the funds.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Are Embezzled Funds 
taxable income?
Did the defendant 
willfully refuse to pay 
taxes on Embezzled 
Funds? 
Can the defendant be 
charged with failure 
to pay taxes on 
Embezzled Funds? 
Warren  (3) Yes (3) No (3) No (3)
Clark (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Harlan  (2) Yes (2) Yes (2) Yes (2)
Douglas (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Whitaker (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
TOTAL Yes  6-3 Yes 5-4 No 6-3 
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4. National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman -Gordon Co. , 394 U.S. 759 (1969)
The NLRB ordered an employer to provide a list of its employees’ names to a 
union seeking to organize the employees. In an earlier adjudication with different 
parties, the NLRB had announced a prospective “rule” that employers needed to 
provide such a list.  A majority of the Justices voted that the earlier rule was invalid 
as the NLRB did not have discretion to promulgate rules in adjudicatory proceedings. 
A majority also ruled that without formal rule-making proceedings, such a 
requirement could not be imposed in the instant case. Nonetheless, the Court voted to 
require the employer to make the employee list available.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Does NLRB rule, 
announced in 
adjudicatory 
proceeding, that 
employers give list of 
employees to union 
bind future 
employers?
Can NLRB impose  
requirement that 
employers give list of 
employees to union in 
this case without 
rule-making 
procedures?
Must Employer give 
list of employees to 
union?
Fortas  (4) No (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Black (3) Yes (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Harlan  (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
Douglas (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
TOTAL No 6-3 No 5-4 Yes 7-2 
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5. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)
A criminal defendant was convicted based, in part, on hearsay evidence. A 
majority of the Court voted that the Confrontation Clause is violated if hearsay 
evidence is admitted which creates “a real risk of impairing the accuracy of the truth-
determining process.”  A different majority voted that the evidence in the defendant’s 
case created such a risk.  Nonetheless, the Court voted that admitting the hearsay 
evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Is Confrontation 
Clause violated by 
admission of hearsay 
evidence which 
creates a “real risk” 
of inaccurate fact-
finding?
Did the hearsay 
evidence in this case 
create a “real risk” 
of inaccurate fact-
finding?
Was the 
Confrontation Clause 
violated by admission 
of hearsay evidence 
in the instant case?
Stewart (4) Yes(4) No  (4) No (4)
Harlan  (1) No (1) Yes  (1) No (1)
Marshall (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
TOTAL Yes 8-1 Yes 5-4 No 5-4 
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6. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
A criminal defendant was convicted in a state court with less than a 
unanimous verdict.  A majority of the Court voted that a unanimous jury was 
required in federal criminal trials, and a different majority voted that the same 
standard applies to state as to federal criminal trials.  Nonetheless, the Court 
voted that a unanimous jury was not required in state criminal trials.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Is a unanimous jury 
required in federal 
criminal trials?
Does the same 
standard apply in 
state and federal 
criminal trials?
Is a unanimous jury 
required in state 
criminal trials?
White (4) No (4) Yes  (4) No (4)
Powell (1) Yes (1) No  (1) No (1)
Stewart + Douglas 
(4)*
Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 8-1 No 5-4 
* The two opinions of Justices Stewart and Douglas, were both joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall.  The relevant opinions are found in both Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) and  Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)
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7. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba , 406 U.S. 759 (1972)
When Cuba sued a bank over a loan, the bank counter-claimed, based on 
Cuba’s seizing of its property. A majority of the Court found that the “act of state” 
doctrine generally precludes judicial review when a foreign government takes 
property within its borders. Different majorities also found that there was no 
exception even if the President attempts to authorize jurisdiction, and that there was 
no exception for counter-claims. Nonetheless, a majority found that the Court had 
jurisdiction.
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Can Court 
Generally Hear 
Case When 
Foreign 
Government 
Seizes Property 
Within its Own 
Territory?
Can the 
President 
authorize 
Jurisdiction in 
such cases?
Is there an 
exception for 
counter-claims?
Does the Court 
have 
jutisdiction?
Rehnquist (3)  No (3) Yes  (3) Yes  (3) Yes  (3)
Douglas (1) No (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Powell (1) Yes (1) Not Say (1) No (1) Yes (1)
Brennan (4)  No (4)  No (4)  No (4)  No (4)
TOTAL No 8-1 No 5-3 No 5-4 Yes 5-4 
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8. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. , 448 U.S. 261 (1980)
An injured worker wanted to file a second worker’s compensation claim in 
Washington D.C., after receiving an award in Virginia.  There were two competing 
precedents: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), which had held 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause barred a second suit; and Industrial Commission 
v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947), which permitted second suits unless the first state 
had a statute with “unmistakable language” barring such suits.  A majority of the 
Justices voted to overrule McCartin. A different majority voted that Magnolia should 
not be overruled.  Nonetheless, the Court voted to permit the second suit.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Can an Injured 
Worker Bring Suit in  
a 2nd State without 
regard to the Full 
Faith and Credit 
Clause? 
Does the First State 
have the right to bar 
a second suit only by 
“Unmistakable 
Language”?
Can this Injured 
Worker Bring Suit in 
a 2nd State?
Stevens (4) Yes (4) No  (4) Yes  (4)
White (3) No (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Rehnquist (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
TOTAL No 5-4 No 6-3 Yes 7-2 
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9. Guardians Association v . Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
A majority of the Court concluded that disparate impact, without proof of 
discriminatory intent, was enough to violate the regulations promulgated under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  A different majority concluded that 
compensatory damages should be available for violations of regulations promulgated 
under Title VI.  Nonetheless, the Court voted that compensatory damages would not 
be available for violations of regulations promulgated under Title VI if there is only a 
showing of disparate impact, without proof of discriminatory intent.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Are Compensatory 
Damages Available 
For Violations Of 
Regulations 
Promulgated Under 
Title VI?
Is Disparate Impact 
Sufficient to Violate 
the Regulations 
Promulgated Under 
Title VI?
Are Compensatory 
Damages Available 
For Violations Of 
Regulations 
Promulgated Under 
Title VI if Only 
Disparate Impact is 
shown?
White (1) Yes  (1) No (1) No (1)
Powell (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
O’Connor (1)  No (1) Yes  (1) No (1)
Marshall (1) Yes  (1) Yes  (1) Yes  (1)
Stevens (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)  Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4  Yes 5-4  No 5-4 
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10. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  491 U.S. 110 (1989)
The biological father of a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting 
with, another man at time of child's conception and birth, wanted to sue under 
California law for visitation rights.   A majority of the Justices voted that a state may 
not constitutionally deny a hearing on visitation rights to the biological father of such 
a child.  A different majority voted that California law denied such a hearing.  
Nonetheless, the Court voted that the California law was constitutional.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Can a State Deny a 
Biological Father a 
Hearing on Visiting 
Child If Mother Was 
Married To, and  
Cohabiting With 
Another Man, at, 
Child’s Conception 
and Birth?
Does California Law 
Permit a Hearing on 
Visiting Child If 
Mother Was Married 
To, and  Cohabiting 
With Another Man, 
at, Child’s 
Conception and 
Birth?
Is California law 
Constitutional?
Scalia (4) Yes  (4) No (4) Yes (4)
Stevens (1) No (1) Yes  (1) Yes (1)
Brennan (3) No (3) No (3) No  (3)
White  (1) No  (1) No  (1) No  (1)
TOTAL No 5-4  No 8-1  Yes 5-4 
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11. American Trucking Associations, Inc., v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)
The Supreme Court ruled in American Trucking Association v. Scheiner, 483 
U.S. 266 (1987) (Sheiner), that an unapportioned flat highway use tax  violated the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. In Smith, a majority of the Justices voted that Scheiner
had been properly decided, and a different majority voted that non-criminal 
constitutional rules should be applied retroactively.  Nonetheless, the Court voted that 
Scheiner should not be applied retroactively.
Author of Opinion 
and Number of 
Justices Joining the 
Opinion
Was Scheiner 
properly decided?
Should Constitutional 
decisions be applied 
retroactively?
Should Scheiner be 
applied retroactively?
O’Connor (4) Yes (4) No  (4) No (4)
Scalia (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Stevens (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
TOTAL Yes 8-1 Yes 5-4 No (5-4)
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NOTES
1 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, visited August 15, 2004,  http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=irrational.
2 The On-line Medical Dictionary, http://www.graylab.ac.uk/omd/index.html
3 The first time the Supreme Court used the phrase “rational basis” in a constitutional test was 
1914, when it declared, “The State has a wide range of discretion with respect to establishing
classes for the purpose of imposing revenue taxes, and its laws upon the subject are not to be set 
aside as discriminatory unless it clearly appears that there is no rational basis for the 
classification.” Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304, 316 (1914)(emphasis added).  
The Court’s first use of the word “rational” in a constitutional standard was four years earlier in 
Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910): “That a legislative presumption of 
one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of 
the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection 
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed....”Id. (emphasis added).
4 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
5 Stenberg v. Carhart,  120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000)(Stevens, J. concurring).
6 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 334 (1993)(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part)
7 Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 862, —  (2000)(Scalia, J. dissenting)
8 Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997)(O’Connor, J. concurring).  See also Bush v.  
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1031(1996)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(stating that, “it is irrational to assume that a 
person is not qualified to vote or to serve as a juror simply because she has brown hair or brown 
skin. It is neither irrational, nor invidious, however, to assume that a black resident of a particular 
community is a Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that 97% of the blacks in that 
community vote in Democratic primary elections.”)
9 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
10 Id., 517 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added).
11 Id., 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J. dissenting)(emphasis added).The Supreme Court ruled that it was 
not rational to criminalize homosexual activity in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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12 This is comparable to the rule of logic known as the “law of the excluded middle,” which states 
that a given proposition is either true or untrue. Steven F. Barker, The Elements of Logic 120 
(1980).  For examples in law of this rule, see e.g. Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. State, 42 P.3d 531, 545 
(Alas. 2002)(stating that a worker performing a single task cannot be both an employee and an 
independent contractor); Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.,898 P.2d 680, 686 (Mont. 
1995)(stating that, in interpreting lease permitting  removal of natural resources, “coal and gas are 
mutually exclusive terms”).
13 Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
14 Dunn, 284 U.S., at 393.  U.S v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).(jury acquitted defendant of 
possessing two kilograms of cocaine, but found him guilty of using the telephone to possess the 
same two kilograms of cocaine).
15 For an excellent article on inconsistent verdicts, see Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little 
Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 771 (1998).
16 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968).
17 407 U.S. 551, 561-67 (1972).
18 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
19 The field of “social choice” explores the ways in which group decision-making can lead to a set 
of results which would be irrational were they made by a single individual. See e.g., David Luban 
Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1996) (stating, “Social choice 
theory studies the most basic question of democratic politics and welfare economics: How should 
the preferences of many individuals be amalgamated into a single social choice?”). See generally
Michael Abramowicz  and Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of 
Bush v. Gore, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849, 1906 (2001).  
20 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 3, n.4. (1951)
21 See e.g., Kenneth M. O’Brien, Storm Center 293-94 (3rd ed. 1993)
22 See e,g., id. at 314-28.
23 See e.g., id. at 335-52 There are numerous permutations as well. A Justice can sign a majority 
opinion, and file a concurring opinion.  That will not detract from the main opinion reflecting the 
majority’s choice.  Alternatively, a Justice could sign onto part of a majority opinion and dissent 
from the rest.
24 There are actually more than 2 “results” – Affirm; Reverse and Remand; and Reverse and 
Dismiss. In practical terms, though, the Court is usually faced with the choice of Affirm or Reverse.  
In those rare cases where there are three options and no majority in favor of any disposition, a 
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Justice has switched votes to create a majority. See e.g. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 
(1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring)(stating he would have preferred to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court, but was voting to create a majority in favor of “reverse and remand,” rather than 
outright reversal.)
25 Thomas Jefferson, Constitutionality of Residence Bill of 1790, (July 15, 1790), in 2 The 
Founders' Constitution (ed. Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 1987) at 300.
26 See e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 
67 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 707 (1991); Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability--Ironies in the Evolution 
of Social Choice Theory, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 975, 975-81 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 813 (1992); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law 
and Public Choice 38-42 (1991); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making, 
and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1001 (1989); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of 
Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to 
Administrative Agencies, 1986 Duke L.J. 948, 950; Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 82-86 
(1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice 
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2145-62 (1990); 
William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of 
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 18 (1982); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a 
“They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. Econ. 239, 249 (1992); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1309, 1329-50 (1995).
27 See text accompanying notes  — and —, supra.
28 Among the recent works  addressing this issue are: Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive
Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 75 (2003)(hereinafter “A 
Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm”); Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849 
(2001)(hereinafter Beyond Counting Votes); Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Process: A Social 
Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making 111-24 (2000) (hereinafter Constitutional 
Process); Edward A. Hartnett  A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
123 (1999)(hereinafter A Matter of Judgment); Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch 
Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87, 127-28 (1999) 
(hereinafter Should Justices Ever Switch Votes);  David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, Issues and 
Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand L 
Rev 1069 (1996) (hereinafter  Issues and Outcomes); Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting 
Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1045 (1996)(hereinafter How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification); 
John M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical 
Proposals, 49 Vand L Rev 997 (1996) (hereinafter “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate 
Courts); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “Unpacking the Court,” 96 Yale L.J. 82 
(1986); Evan H. Caminker Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
Court Decisionmaking.73 Tex. L. Rev. 1 ( 1994)(hereinafter Precedent and Prediction);  Lewis A. 
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Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1993)(hereinafter; “The One and the Many”); David Post & Steven C. Salop,
Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Geo. L.J. 743 
(1992)(hereinafter; “Rowing Against the Tidewater); John M. Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because 
I'm Wrong”: The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439 (1991)(hereinafter I Vote 
This Way).
29 This sort of irrationality has been variously termed a “doctrinal paradox” see e.g., Kornhauser & 
Sager, supra, The One and the Many,  81 Cal. L. Rev. 1, at 11, and a “voting anomaly.” see e.g.
Stearns, supra, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, 7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 90.
30 See e.g., .Edward Kasner & James Newman, Mathematics and the Imagination 254 (1940).
31 Isaac Toddhunter, History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability 352 (1865), quoted in 
Keith Michael Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics 227 (1975).
32 See e.g., H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 123 (1986).
33 See e.g., Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 
75 Va. L.Rev. 971, --- (1989).
34 See Cheryl D. Block, Truth And Probability - Ironies in The Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 
76 Wash. U. L. Q. 975, 987 (1998)(stating that “hose with control over the agenda or procedures 
are in a position to intentionally manipulate results.”). In fact, even if those in charge desire to be 
neutral, their agenda-setting choice will still determine the election. See Michael E. Levine & 
Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 Va. L. Rev. 561, 589 (1977)(stating that 
the agenda can control the outcome of the voting, even if, “ adopted with the most outcome-neutral 
intentions.").
35 See Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections 236 (1968).  According to 
Steven Brams, as the number of candidates increases towards infinity, the probability of cycling 
occurring among three voters increases to 100%. Steven Brams, Paradoxes in Politics --- (1976). 
See also Archimedes' Revenge, Paul Hoffman 230-31 (1988).
36 C.L Dodgson, A Method of Taking Votes on More than Two Issues (1876), reprinted in 
Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections 224, 230 (1968). In fact, the likelihood 
of cycling increases with an increase in the number of different options from which to choose.  See 
Brams, Paradoxes in Politics, supra note , at ___(stating that as the number of candidates increases 
towards infinity, the probability of cycling occurring among three voters increases to 100%.).
37 Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, supra note , at  42-59.
38 Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance 12-13 (1997).
39 Hoffman, Archimedes' Revenge, supra note , at 221.
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40 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982).
41 Id., 95 Harv.L.Rev. At 831.
42 Consider Justice Scalia’s opinion in Cruzan, v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 
U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan,  the Court, by a 5-4 vote,  ruled that the State of Missouri did not 
violate the Due Process Clause by requiring parents of a comatose daughter to prove “by clear and 
convincing evidence” that she would have wanted the termination of life support. The Court stated 
that the “State's great interest in the “protection and preservation  of human life.”Id. at 283, 
outweighed the “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.” 
Id. at 278.  Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion,  but wrote a concurring opinion indicating 
that he preferred a different rationale:
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore join in its opinion, I 
would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal courts 
have no business in this field; that American law has always accorded the State the 
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide -- including suicide by refusing to 
take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life....
Id. at 293.
43 Specifically, in none of the cases discussed in this Article do the Justices describe their 
preference order for all permutations of the issues in a case.  Since the cases collected in this Article 
are the most fractured of the multi-issue cases, and because there is no obvious reason for a Justice 
to go through such a process, it seems highly unlikely that such a listing has occurred in any case.
44 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (U.S. 1971).
45 In the real case, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun voted to uphold the See
id. 403 U.S. at 756 (Harland, J. dissenting (stating the President had “constitutional primacy in the 
field of foreign affairs.”) Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun signed Harlan’s dissent.
46 In the real case, Justices Marshall, White, and Stewart focused on the Separation of Powers. See 
id. 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring)(“The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has 
the power to make law.”); id. 403 U.S. at 732 (White, J. concurring)(“At least in the absence of 
legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree 
that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having 
such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press.”).  Justice Stewart joined Justice 
White’s opinion.
47 In the real case, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Black focused exclusively on the First 
Amendment and did not discuss the Separation of Powers. See id. 403 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, 
J.,concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial 
restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these cases.”);  id.  403 U.S. at 714-15 (Black, 
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J.,concurring) ( “I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these 
newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment.”) 
Justice Douglas joined Justice Black’s opinion.
48 I took the phrase "shifting majority" from Rogers, I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong, supra
note,  79 Ky. L.J. at 456
49 Note that the exact same result could follow even if the preference order did not result in 
cycling.  Consider the same voting breakdown, only this time assume that the Harlan group was so 
concerned with Separation of Powers that its strongest preference was to have the injunction lifted 
on Separation of Powers grounds alone, with its next preference being relying on both.
The Justices’ revised preference order would then appear as follows [with the changed votes 
in bold]:
Marshall, White,
Stewart 
[3 votes]
Douglas, Black, 
Brennan,
[3 votes]
Harlan, Burger, 
Blackmun 
[3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
2 Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Violates Both Violates Both 
3 Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Only Violates 
1st Amendment
4 Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
This time there is no cycling.  “Violates Both”  prevails over the other three choices in head-
to-head competitions, defeating “Only Violates Sep of Power” 6-3 [Marshall + Douglas prevailing]; 
defeating “Only Violates 1st Am 6-3 [Marshall and Harlan prevailing]; and defeating “Not Violate 
either” 9-0.Thus, “Violates Both” is the Condorcet winner and there is no lack of transitivity.
The Court’s decision, again might be contained in three separate opinions, all supporting the 
newspaper and each expressing a different set of issue resolutions.  The Court might, however, end 
up again with an opinion with “shifting majorities,” holding that the President violated both the 
Separation of Powers and  the First Amendment.
Thus, whether or not head-to-head voting results in cycling, the process of Supreme Court 
voting can lead to the identical finished product.
50 Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note ,  7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 109.
51 Id.., 7 S.Ct. Econ. Rev. at 110.
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52 See text accompanying notes — supra.
53 One such example might be Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992), where four Justices went 
along with Justice Kennedy’s opinion that prayer at a high school graduation was an 
unconstitutional “coercion” of religion by the Government, even though the four apparently saw the 
case as more of an “endorsement” of religion which violated the First Amendment. Id. 505 U.S. at  
609 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(stating that “our cases have prohibited government endorsement of 
religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not citizens were coerced to 
conform”.”)Justice Kennedy had previously refused to find mere “endorsement” as 
unconstitutional, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.573, 655 1989)(Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)(stating that “This view of the Establishment Clause reflects an unjustified hostility 
toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our precedents....” )   Accordingly, the 
four joined Justice Kennedy’s “coercion” analysis to constitute a winning majority opinion.
54 Stearns, supra note , 7 S.Ct. Econ. Rev. at 110.
55 Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, supra note, at 831.
56 See e,g,Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985), overruling 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and holding Congress can enforce 
minimum-wage laws against the states.
57 Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, supra note , at  830.
58 For example, the principles could be federalism, separation of powers, and stare decisis.
59 See e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  In holding unconstitutional a federal law 
which required state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers, the majority opinion cited two values: federalism (“The Constitution thus 
contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens”) 
and separation of powers (“The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the 
laws enacted by Congress; the President.”). Id.  521 U.S. at 920 & 922.
60 Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values,  supra note , at 3.
61 U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  The Court struck down Section 13981 of  the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, §  40302, 108 Stat. 1941-1942.
62 Morrisson, 529 U.S. at 617.
63 Id., 529 U.S. at 618.
64 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628  (Souter, J., dissenting)
65 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)(upholding Civil Rights 
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Act); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding anti-loan sharking law).
66 Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)(stating that any incidental burden on the 
free exercise of religion must be justified by a “compelling state interest”), with Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)(stating that if a burden on the free exercise of religion is merely 
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment 
has not been offended.”).
67 501 U.S. 560 (1991)
68 Barnes,  501 U.S. at 562. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality)
69 Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
70 Id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
71 DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 409 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997).
72 Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, supra note, at 831
73 Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of 
a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1541, 1553 (1993).
74 414 U.S. 453 (1974)
75 414 U.S. at 456.
76 467 U.S. 340 (1984)
77 Block , 467 U.S. at 353, n. 4.
78 523 U.S. 83 (1998)
79 Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 101.
80 Justice Stevens referred to this result as “a logical dilemma,” Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 120, 
n12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia, for the Court, referred to the lack of transitivity as “a 
broken circle.” Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 97 n2.
81 See Kornhauser and Sager, Unpacking the Court, supra note , 96 Yale L.J. at 117 
n35(1986)(stating that, “a perfectly stable voting pattern emerges from such a court. If the 
individual judges decide cases consistently, like cases will be decided alike, and no problem of 
consistency presents itself.”).  See also Rogers, I Vote This Way , supra note ,79 Ky. L.J. at 468-69.
82 In terms of formal logic, the first sentence in the quote is a syllogism, consisting of , of  two 
alternate premises and a conclusion. The next sentence declares the two premises to be true. The 
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last sentence rejects the conclusion. Assuming there are no unspoken premises, this would be an 
illogical conclusion.
83 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
84 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
85 There were actually five opinions, with all three dissenters, Justices Ginsburg, Souter and 
Breyer, signing onto two decisions, one authored by Justice Ginsburg, the other by Justice Breyer.  
For purposes of the analysis of the Court’s irrationality in Miller, it is easier to consider just Justice 
Breyer’s opinion, as Justice Ginsburg’s focused primarily on the history of discriminatory 
immigration laws and did not address the other two issues of the case. Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 -71 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
86 Miller, 523 U.S. at  436 & 444-45 (Stevens, J.).
87 Id., 523 U.S. at 455 n1. (Scalia, J., concurring).
88 Id. 523 U.S. at 453.
89 Id., 523 U.S. at 445 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
90 Id., 523 U.S. at 452-53.
91 Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissent in which Justices Breyer and Souter joined.  Because her 
opinion did not address all of the issues raised in the case, and she joined in Breyer’s opinion, for 
this analysis I will treat her opinions as reflected in Breyer’s dissenting opinion.
92 Miller, 523 U.S. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The lower court had ruled that the father 
lacked standing because he was not harmed by his daughter’s lack of citizenship.
93 Rainey v. Chever ,270 Ga. 519; 510 S.E.2d 823, cert den. 527 U.S. 1044 (1999).  The statute 
stated that  "neither the father nor any child of the father nor any other paternal kin shall inherit 
from or through a child born out of wedlock if it shall be established by a preponderance of 
evidence that the father failed or refused openly to treat the child as his own or failed or refused to 
provide support for the child." Ga. Code Ann. §  53-2- 4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
94 Rainey ,270 Ga. at 520; 510 S.E.2d at 824. See also U. S. v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 
1126 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “had the facts in Miller been like those in this case, a majority of 
the Court would have found [the law] unconstitutional by applying heightened scrutiny.”). Accord
Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141 (2nd Cir. 2000).
95 U. S. v. Gomez-Orozco, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1094 (C.D.Ill. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 188 
F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 1999).   See also Nguyen v. I.N.S. , 208 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d 533 
U.S ---. , 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001)(upholding sex discrimination in immigration law, in part, because, 
“The [Miller]court found that the statute met several important governmental objectives....”); 
-105-
Breyer v. Meissner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (granting deference to Congress in matters 
of immigration, even when they involve sex discrimination).  See also Rainey v. Chever,527 U.S. 
1044, 1047 (1999)(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)(stating that, “while the 
fractured decision in Miller may demonstra te the need for additional guidance as to the 
constitutionality of laws differentiating between fathers and mothers of out-of-wedlock children, it 
does not stand for the proposition that all generalizations based on gender are constitutionally 
infirm..”)
96 533 U.S. 53  (2001).
97 Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, stating that he still 
believed that “the Court lacks power to provide relief of the sort requested in this suit....” Nguyen, 
533 U.S at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring).  He wrote that because, a “majority of the Justices in Miller
having concluded otherwise, (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J.);  
(GINSBURG, J., joined by SOUTER and BREYER, JJ., dissenting); (BREYER, J., joined by 
SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., dissenting); and a majority of the Court today proceeding on the 
same assumption,” it was “appropriate” for him to reach the merits of the equal protection claims. 
Id. (citations to specific pages omitted).  Id., 533 U.S. at 73-74.  It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia 
seems to be implying that the five votes on the issue garnered from the different opinions in Miller
was worthy of comparable respect to the votes comprising the majority in the Court’s opinion in 
Nguyen.
98 Id., 533 U.S at 58(citations to specific pages omitted).
99 Miller, 523 U.S. at 452-53 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
100 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-65.
101 Id., 533 U.S. at 73.
102 Nguyen, 533 U.S at 87 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  She suggested several gender-neutral means 
for accomplishing the governmental purposes, such as  a requirement that the parent be present at 
birth or have knowledge of birth. Id. at 88.
103 Id., 533 U.S at 97,(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
104 See e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 2297, 2304 (1999), describing the “basic legal issues on whose resolution the proper 
case disposition depends.”
105 The determination of when a issue is “preliminary” is more a matter of law than of logic.  For 
example, in order to constrain the power of the Courts, issues as to jurisdiction are generally 
decided before the Court reaches the substance of an issue. See e.g. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).  Similarly, when faced with both a statutory and constitutional issue, 
the Court will resolve the statutory issue first, in order to be able to avoid a constitutional decision 
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if possible. See e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
106 Just because the secondary issue does not need to be addressed if the primary issue is resolved 
a certain way, does not mean the secondary issue will not be discussed by the Justices. A Justice 
may rationally present a “conditional” analysis, finding no jurisdiction and then discussing the 
merits after declaring, “If there is jurisdiction....” Thus, it is often possible to determine each 
Justice’s view on the secondary issue, even if some believe the primary issue will conclude the 
case.
107 Because the conclusion that a law passes the compelling interest test cannot rationally coexist 
with the conclusion that the same law fails mid-level scrutiny, see text accompanying notes —, 
supra, the issues of whether mid-level and compelling interest scrutiny are met are not “distinct” 
issues.
108 The definition of “loser” does not include certain situations where some Justices decline to 
address a particular issue. For example, consider a case where four Justices find no jurisdiction but 
say nothing about the merits, another four find jurisdiction and a  violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, and one finds jurisdiction and no violation of equal protection.  In such a case, a majority 
(4+1) finds jurisdiction, so the proposition that there is no jurisdiction is a “loser.”  Since there are 
not at least five votes for either side on the Equal Protection issue, neither view of that clause is a 
“loser” for this case.
109 This, of course, is what happened in Miller, and is the focus of this Article.
110 If there are more than two issues, the analysis would be identical if all of the voters 
unanimously place all but the same two choices at the bottom of their list of preferences.
111 Note that this proof assumes that the number of Justices is odd.
112 The Irrationality Theorem can be easily generalized to cover more than two distinct issues. For 
all but two issues, one rational outcome would be if the Justices were unanimous on the resolution 
of each issue in such a way that the case was not concluded. For example, the Justices could find 
the plaintiff had standing, or that one part of the Constitution was not violated. Thus, the resolution 
of the case would depend on the other resolution of two issues.  From there, we have proven an 
irrational result is always possible. 
113 Irrational results can be achieved through many voting permutations other than the one utilized 
in the proof. Consider the following matrix of voting possibilities. 
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ISSUE A
Split wins Issue
A
Total t wins
Issue A
Split wins Issue 
B
S wins A
S wins B
S WINS CASE
I
T wins A
S wins B
S WINS CASE
II
ISSUE B Total wins 
Issue B
S wins A
T wins B
S WINS CASE
III
T wins A
T wins B
T WINS CASE
IV
Assume there are two distinct  issues and no majority opinion.  If the votes for the split 
decisions (II + III) total a majority, S wins the case. If the only other votes are for T to win both 
issues (IV), there will be an irrational result. S will win this case, but T will win a majority for each 
issue.  More generally, any time there is no majority opinion, but the sum of each voting 
combination (II + III), (II + IV), and (III + IV) equals a majority, there will be an irrational 
decision.
114 Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note , 79 Ky. L.J. at 443-444.
115 This would hold true no matter how many votes each of the three permutations received. Since 
there is no majority opinion, each box receives few than five votes.  That means that each of the 
other two boxes must equal five or greater.  Thus, Boxes II + IV will be a majority [giving the 
defendant a majority vote on the confession issue] and  Boxes III + IV will be a majority [giving the 
defendant a majority vote on the search issue].
116 See e.g. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note , 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 156 
(describing his analysis of cases with irrational results as focused on “the relevant grouping in 
which a collective intransivity has the potential to occur,”); Abramowicz and Stearns, supra note , 
Beyond Counting Votes, 54 Vand. L. Rev. at 1930 (referring to the voting anomaly, ie the irrational 
result, occurring when there is a “possible set of cyclical preferences” and “no Condorcet winner is 
available.”  See also Rogers, I Vote This Way,  supra note , 79 Ky. L.J. at 466 [stating “This 
anomaly is closely related to the possibility of ‘cycling’....”].
117 See text accompanying notes , supra.
118 The Justices’ preference order was:
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Marshall, White,
Stewart 
[3 votes]
Douglas, Black, 
Brennan,
[3 votes]
Harlan, Burger, 
Blackmun 
[3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 
ORDER
2 Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Violates Both Only Violates 1st
Amendment
3 Only Violates 1st
Amendment
Only Violates 
Sep of Powers
Violates Both
4 Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
Not Violate 
Either
For a discussion of why this creates cycling, see text accompanying notes , supra.
119 The reason the Condorcet winner was not the ourcome of the case is that the Justices do not 
decide which parties win cases using Condorcet’s head-to-head technique.  Thus, while indeed the 
individual choices of “Standing” and “Equal Protection Violation ,” were selected by a majority of 
the Justices, the result of the case  is not one which would follow rationally from those resolutions 
of the relevant issues.
120 Sometimes, a case with multiple issues can be reduced to two issues by breaking up the way 
the issues are considered.  For example, in Miller, there were three issues: standing, separations of 
powers, and equal protection.  By dividing the votes into two categories, first jurisdiction, then the 
merits, the case is reduced to two distinct issues:
I. Jurisdiction 
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Does the Court 
have 
Jurisdiction?
Does Law’s 
Gender-Based 
Distinction 
Violate Equal 
Protection?
Does Miller 
Win?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O’Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not (2)
Scalia (2) No (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-2 Yes 6-3 
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[A majority of the Court, in a rational vote, decides they have jurisdiction to hear the case]
II.  Merits 
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Does the Court 
have 
Jurisdiction?
Does Law’s 
Gender-Based 
Distinction 
Violate Equal 
Protection?
Does Miller 
Win?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O’Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not (2)
Scalia (2) No (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-2 Yes 6-3 
This is the same irrational decision as the original framework, but reduced to two distinct issues. 
For a discussion of cases with multiple issues which cannot be so reduced, see note , infra.
121 See text at notes — supra.
122 It is not necessarily true that the Plaintiff is the party who must win on both distinct issues to 
win the case.  Sometimes it is the Defendant who must prevail on both issues to win the case.  
Consider a constitutional challenge to a state law barring same-sex couples from civil marriage, 
where the plaintiffs argue that the law violates both equal protection and due process.  See e.g., 
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 320 (Mass., 2003).  In order for the defendant 
state to win the case, must win on both the equal protection and due process grounds. As the chart 
below reveals, if the plaintiffs win on either of the split vote permutation, they win the case.
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EQUAL 
PROTECTION
Defendant wins 
Equal 
Protection
Plaintiff wins
Equal 
Protection
Defendant wins 
Due Process
D wins Equal 
Protection
D wins Due 
Process
D WINS CASE
I
P wins Equal 
Protection
D wins Due 
Process
P WINS CASE
II
DUE 
PROCESS
Plaintiff wins 
Due Process
D wins Equal 
Protection
P wins Due 
Process
P WINS CASE
III
P wins Equal 
Protection
P wins Due 
Process
P WINS CASE
IV
123 This mathematical approach permits is a far more precise description than the social choice 
analysis which described the conditions for irrationality, as “multidimensionality and asymmetry.”
See e.g., Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note , 7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 156 .  
Multidimensionality can be most easily understood by contrasting it with “unidimensionality.” A 
question is unidimensional when the different options can be arrayed on a spectrum, where either 
extreme position would prefer a median position to the opposite extreme. Id. at 116-17. Thus, the 
question of whether to put no salt, a little salt, or a lot of salt in a soup, is unidimensional, since, in 
most cases, those who prefer either no salt or a lot of salt would prefer the moderate approach as 
their second choice.  By contrast, if the question involves the possibility of placing more than one 
ingredient, such as  salt and/or carrots in the soup, no such linear ranking is possible, and that 
question would be deemed multidimensional. Id. at 128.  Thus, mulitdimensionality basically refers 
to the same concept as two distinct issues.
According to Prof. Sterns, “Asymmetry arises when two camps resolve each of the two 
dispositive issues in opposite fashion, but nonetheless reach the same judgment.” Maxwell L. 
Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 
Theoretical Inq. L. 125, 144 (2002).  This definition, though, is merely a tautology. As I have 
proven earlier in this Article, whenever Justices divide between split vote possibilities,  two camps 
can resolve each of the two issues in opposite fashion, but nonetheless reach the same judgment. 
See text accompanying notes , supra.  In other words, every case which exhibits 
multidimensionality [ie two issues], will invariable exhibit asymmetry [ie the result of either split 
vote is that the same party wins the case] when different Justices select each split vote option.
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Prof. Nash, in a brief discussion utilizing a more mathematical approach,  comes closer to  
obtaining a full description of when irrationality occurs. Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol 
Paradigm, supra note, 56  Stan. L. Rev. at 80-82.  Nonetheless, his analysis, like Stearn’s does not 
reflect the fact that every situation with two split  vote permutations [what Nash terms “swing 
votes”] will have opposite votes on the issues resulting in the same judgment. Id., 56 Stan. L. Rev. 
at 81. Thus, his analysis also does not include the fact that only one of the two parties can be the 
victor in an irrational case.
124 There is a more mathematical way to describe the votes which lead to an irrational opinion 
using the basic chart:
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue A
Defendant wins
Issue A
Plaintiff wins 
Issue B
P wins A
P wins B
P WINS CASE
I
D wins A
P wins B
D WINS CASE
II
ISSUE B Defendant wins 
Issue B
P wins A
D wins B
P WINS CASE
III
D wins A
D wins B
D WINS CASE
IV
If X = the total number of votes, then  I +III > 1/2X; I +II > 1/2X; and II + III + IV > 1/2X.
125 If there are more than two distinct issues, the situation can get much more complicated. The 
number of split vote scenarios increases rapidly [if there are 3 issues, there are 6 split vote 
permutations, if there are 4 issues, there are 14].  Moreover, it is no longer inevitable that the same 
party will prevail under every split vote permutation. 
The situation is further complicated because of the different structures cases with multiple 
issues can take. For some situations with multiple issues, one party must prevail on all to win the 
case.  For example, a private school faced with losing a tax break because of its racially 
discriminatory admissions policies claimed that the I.R.S was violating its rights to the free exercise 
of religion, to free association, and to due process and equal protection of the laws. Bob Jones 
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735-736 (1974).  It order to win the case, the Government 
needed to prevail on every issue.
By contrast, in some cases of more than two issues, different parties can win split decisions. 
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For example, in Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998), a white criminal defendant was 
challenging his conviction because on the grounds that there was racial discriminations against 
African-Americans in the selection of grand jurors. For the defendant to prevail, he needed to win 
on the standing issue, and on either the equal protection or due process claims.  Thus, both parties 
could win a split decision. The defendant could win the case by winning on only two of three issues 
[standing and either equal protection or due process] and the government could win by winning on 
only two of three issues [either winning both equal protection or due process and losing standing or 
winning standing and either equal protection or due process]
Despite the complexities of cases with multiple issues, the basic principles of irrationality 
still hold.  An irrational result for more than two distinct issues always requires that there be no 
majority opinion, and that there be votes for at least two split vote permutations.
126 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 
U.S. 582 (1949); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 162 (1967); National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon Co. , 394 U.S. 759 
(1969); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);  First Nat'l 
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 
448 U.S. 261 (1980); Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  491 U.S. 110 (1989); American Trucking Associations, Inc., v. Smith, 496 
U.S. 167 (1990); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 
498 (1998).  For a discussion of Miller, see section —, supra.
127 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
128 The formal name for the Coal Act is the Coal  Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992,  26 
U.S.C. § §  9701-9722 (1994 ed. and Supp. II).
129 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 530-31 (O’Connor, J., plurality).
130 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "Nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."
131 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 537 (O’Connor, J., plurality).
132 Id.   The plurality did say that because they found that the Coal Act “violates the Takings 
Clause as applied to Eastern, we need not address Eastern's due process claim.” Id.   The obvious 
antipathy the plurality felt towards finding a substantive due process violation can be seen in the 
two quotations given to support their “concerns”.  First, the plurality noted the Court’s 
“abandonment of the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a 
majority of the Court believe to be economically unwise.” Id., quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726, 731(1963).  Next, the plurality repeated the declaration that, “The day is gone when this 
Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.” Id., at 537-38, quoting  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
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(1955).
133 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 544 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting 
in part.).
134 Id. at 549.
135 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136 Id., 524 U.S. at 553-554.
137 Even though Justice O’Connor stated that “we need not address Eastern's due process claim,” 
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 537 (O’Connor, J., plurality), it is reasonable to interpret Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion as reflecting opposition to finding a due process violation.  The two quotes she 
provides to support her “concerns” about using Due Process indicate, at minimum, a very strong 
reluctance to apply the Due Process Clause in cases of purely economic concern.  She cited  
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (noting "our abandonment of the use of the 'vague 
contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believe to be 
economically unwise")  and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, 
regulatory of business  and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out 
of harmony with a particular school of thought"), quoted at Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 537-
38.
Moreover, if all four Justices signing on to the plurality opinion had been willing to rely on 
the Due Process Clause, they could have established, with Justice Kennedy’s fifth vote, a majority 
for that proposition.  Because of the usual institutional desire for clear precedent, see infra text 
accompanying notes —, the willingness to create a splintered decision implies a lack of enthusiasm 
for the Due Process Clause.  
Finally, for the conclusion that a majority of the Court favored one party yet ruled in favor 
of the other to be correct, only one member of O’Connor’s plurality would need to join the four 
dissenting Justices in opposition to finding a violation of the Due Process Clause.  Considering the 
hostility evinced by Justices Scalia and Thomas to extending the Due Process Clause, such a state 
of affairs seems more than likely. See e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980 (U.S., 
2000)(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, “Nothing in our Federal Constitution deprives the people of 
this country of the right to determine whether the consequences of abortion to the fetus and to 
society outweigh the burden of an unwanted pregnancy on the mother. Although a State may permit 
abortion, nothing in the Constitution dictates that a State must do so.”); Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990)(Scalia, J., concurring)(stating “The text of the 
Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It 
protects them against deprivations of liberty ‘without due process of law.’”).
138 Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649 (3rd Cir.) cert.den. --- U.S.— (1999) 
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139 Parella v. Retirement Bd.,173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 1999). See also Unity Real Estate Co. v. 
Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 659 (3rd Cir.) cert.den. --- U.S.— (1999)(stating, “we are bound to follow 
the five-four vote against the takings claim in Eastern....”). Accord Holland v. Big River Minerals 
Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 1999) cert. den. — U.S. — (2000).
140 U.S. V. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).  See also
Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 718 (10th Cir. 
2004)(stating “When a regulation adjusts the benefits and burdens of certain economic action to 
promote the common good, such regulation may in certain circumstances effect a taking.”);  Anker 
Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161 (3rd Cir.)  Cert. Den. --- U.S. ---
(1999)(analyzing retroactivity by noting, “The plurality also found the lack of proportionality 
significant in its analysis of whether the Coal Act substantially interfered with Eastern Enterprises' 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and whether the nature of the governmental action was 
unusual....”).
141 Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 659 (3rd Cir.) cert.den. --- U.S.— (1999).
142 Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel,156 F.3d 1246, 1257 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 
Accord U.S. V. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
143 This topic has been the subject of two excellent articles,  Maxwell L. Stearns, “Should Justices 
Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 
(1999); and John M. Rogers, “‘I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong.’: The Supreme Court Justice 
as Epimenides” 79 Ky. L.J. 439 (1991).
144 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  Professors Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stearns have similarly 
concluded that the decision of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to join the 
per curiam decision reflected their desire to avoid having to “decide a landmark case involving a 
presidential election ....based upon a set of rationales that simple counting could disclose not to 
support the judgment.” Abramowicz and Stearns, supra note , Beyond Counting Votes, 54 Vand. L. 
Rev. at  1939.
145 It was, in fact, an equal protection analysis many could oppose.  In the words of one 
commentator: 
A striking feature of the Court's opinion is its failure to utilize any of the normal 
machinery of equal protection analysis. There is no discussion of the relevant 
classes, no articulation of the appropriate level of review, no effort to determine 
whether a "purpose" or "effects" test is appropriate, no weighing of the 
countervailing state interest supporting the classification.
Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad about Bush V. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled Election, 
47 Wayne L. Rev. 953, 973 (2001). See also Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the 
Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613, 
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635 (2001)(hereinafter “In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”)(describing the 
per curium’s equal protection analysis “as a confused nonstarter at best, which deserves much of 
the scorn that has been heaped upon it.”).
146 See e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1781, 1827 (2001)(stating, “The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore embraced a novel and 
rather expansive understanding of equal protection that seems largely out of character for the 
Rehnquist Court”); Sanford Levinson, The Return of Legal Realism, 272 The Nation 8 (January 8, 
2001). (“How can one take seriously the majority's claims that their award of the presidency to 
Bush is based on their deep concern for safeguarding the fundamental values of equality? This 
majority has been infamous in recent years for relentlessly defending states' rights against the 
invocation of national legal or constitutional norms.”); Abramowicz and Stearns, supra note , 
Beyond Counting Votes, 54 Vand. L. Rev. at 1928 (stating “[T]he equal protection analysis appears 
to be in tension with the general jurisprudence of these three conservative jurists, and that includes 
the issue of voting rights.”).
147 519 U.S. 102 (1996). In M.L.B., the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated 
when a state conditioned the taking of an appeal from the termination of parental rights on that 
parent's ability to pay record transcription costs.
148 M.L.B. ,519 U.S. at 135.
149 See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct,” supra
note ,  68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 616 (2001)(stating that, “In a word, the Florida scheme is devoid of any 
suspect classification needed to trigger the equal protection analysis.”).
150 As the Court described the three tests in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 439 (1985): 
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.... The general rule gives way, however, 
when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin....  
[T]hese laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only 
if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.... 
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened 
standard of review.... A gender classification fails unless it is 
substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.
151 See, Abramowicz and Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes, supra note , 54 Vand. L. Rev. at 1939, 
n109. (Noting that an online search in the Westlaw Supreme Court cases database showed that the 
phrase "arbitrary and disparate treatment" as a test for a violation of equal protection had never 
appeared in a Supreme Court case.); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of 
Constitutional History, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1721, 1727(2001) (Stating that, “The majority's equal 
protection rationale creates entirely new law.”); Jamin B. Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore 
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and Why We Need to Amend the Constitution to Ensure it Never Happens Again, 61 Md. L. Rev. 
652, 678 (2002)(stating that “no doctrinal foundation existed for what the conservative Justices did 
in Bush v. Gore.”).
152 See e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992)(Rehnquist, C.J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (stating “The joint opinion, following its newly minted variation on
stare decisis...”).  This opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, and Thomas, as well as Justice White.
153 It has been reported that Justice Kennedy authored the per curiam opinion. See, e.g., David A. 
Kaplan, The Accidental President 284-85 (2001); Jeffery Rosen, “In Lieu of Manners,” N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 4, 2001, (Magazine), at 50.
154 See Linda Greenhouse, “Bush v. Gore: A Special Report; Election Case a Test and a Trauma 
for Justices,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2001, at A1.  Ms. Greenhouse reports that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s draft had been intended as the majority opinion, but “failed to get the support of 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. They drafted their own opinion, concluding that the standardless 
recount violated the guarantee of equal protection.” Id.
155 The chart of the actual decision of Bush v Gore looks like this:
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Did the Florida 
Supreme Court 
Establish New  
Election 
Standards in
Violation of Art. 
II?
Did the Use of  
“Standardless” 
Recounts Violate 
Equal 
Protection?
Assuming an 
Equal Protection 
Violation, Did 
Safe Harbor 
Date Preclude a 
Recount? 
Should Recount 
be Stopped?
Per Curium (5)  Not Say (5) Yes  (5) Yes (5) Yes  (5)
Rehnquist (3) Yes  (3) Not Say  (3) Not Say (3) Yes (3)
Breyer (2)  No (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
Stevens (2)  No (2)  No (2)  No (2)  No (2)
TOTAL No 6-3 Yes 7-2 Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4 
This is obviously not an “irrational” decision, since a majority supported a resolution of the 
Equal Protection argument in such a way that is squares with the Court’s outcome.
156 This is also the conclusion reached by Abramowicz  and Stearns:
[A]bsent the apparent vote switch by the Rehnquist camp, a complaint that six 
Justices rejected the proposition that there was an equal protection problem 
demanding reversal and that six Justices rejected the proposition that the Florida 
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Supreme Court had effected an unconstitutional change in Florida election law 
would have been both easy to understand and powerful. Whether or not the Justices 
consciously recognized the potential existence of an issue voting anomaly, they 
presumably would have intuitively understood the likelihood of criticism of a 
disposition that lacks majority support for either of the two logically plausible, and 
agreed upon, rationales supporting a reversal. 
Abramowicz  and Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes, supra note , 54 Vand. L. Rev. at  1952, n328.
157 Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 687 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (D. Tex., 1988).  This 
decision was reversed but, fortunately, on other grounds. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. Tex. 1988) cert. den., 486 U.S. 1023 (1988)(District Court reversed because 
plaintiff had not proven standing for a preliminary injunction ).
158 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 556  (1988).
159 Paul Gerwirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L. J. 585, 667 (1983).
160 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts 205 (1985).
161 Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled , 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1108, 1143 
(1995).
162 See  David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 737 
(1987)(stating that, “ lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and its detection only serves 
to increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judging and of judges.”).
163 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 175 (1982). See also Hellman, The 
Importance of Appearing Principled, supra note , 37 Ariz. L. Rev. at 1127 (stating that, “a judge 
ought to avoid acting in a way that is likely to compromise the perceived integrity of the 
judiciary.”).
164 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105.
165 There are strong institutional reasons for a Justice to switch his or her vote to ensure that a case 
is able to be resolved with a majority vote as to the judgment. See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 643, 672 (2002)(stating that, because 
of a “ judgment impasse ... a vote switch is therefore appropriate”).  As Justice Rutledge explained, 
“Stalemate should not prevail for any reason, however compelling, in a criminal cause or, if 
avoidable, in any other.”  Screws v United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, concurring). 
Professor Stearns describes several cases where a Justice switched votes to produce a majority 
judgement.  Stearns, supra, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note,  7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 
110. These cases include: Bragdon v Abbott , 524 U.S. 624, 656 (1998)(Stevens, concurring) 
(casting vote to remand rather than to affirm to produce majority judgment); Pennsylvania v Muniz, 
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496 U.S. 582, 608 (1990) (Rehnquist, concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (casting vote to vacate and remand, to produce a majority judgment); 
Connecticut v Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1983) (Stevens, concurring) (casting vote to affirm, 
rather than to dismiss certiorari, to produce majority judgment); Maryland Casualty Co. v Cushing, 
347 U.S. 409, 423 (1954) (plurality opinion) (voting to remand, rather than to reverse,); Klapprott v 
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 619 (1949) (Rutledge, concurring) ( voting to remand, rather than to 
reverse); Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726-27 (1948) (plurality opinion) (observing that two 
concurring justices have agreed to break deadlock by voting with plurality to remand, rather than 
voting to reverse); Screws, 325 U.S. at 134 (Rutledge, concurring) (switching vote to remand). Id.at 
110 n76.
166 Essentially, this would mean that a Justice with a split vote was choosing to vote for the 
judgment of the party who needed to prevail on all of the issues to win the case.
167 491 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1989), overruled in Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For a 
discussion of the overruling, see note , infra.
168 This would have been the vote tally had all of the Justices voted for the judgment that was 
consistent with their individual assessment of the issues:
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Did Congress 
Authorize Suits 
for damages 
against States in 
the Superfund 
Law?
Does Congress 
have the 
Constitutional 
Authority to 
Authorize such 
Suits?
Can Union Gas 
sue 
Pennsylvania?
Brennan (4) Yes  (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Rehnquist (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
 Scalia (1) Yes (1) No (1) No  (1)
White  (1) No  (1) Yes (1) No  (1)
TOTAL Yes 5-4  Yes 5-4  No 5-4 
Technically, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not “author” an opinion in this case.  Rather, he, 
along with Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, signed onto part of Justice Scalia’s opinion and part of 
Justice White’s, indicating that three of them believed that Congress did not intend the law to 
permit such private suits and that Congress lacked the power to do so.
169 Justice White wrote: 
-119-
My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however; a majority of the Court 
has ruled that the statute, as amended, plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of 
the States from suit in the federal courts. I accept that judgment. This brings me to 
the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate the States' 
immunity. In that respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in 
Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.....
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 56 - 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)
170 This is what the actual vote tally was:
Author of 
Opinion and 
Number of 
Justices Joining 
the Opinion
Did Congress 
Authorize Suits 
for damages 
against States in 
the Superfund 
Law?
Does Congress 
have the 
Constitutional 
Authority to 
Authorize such 
Suits?
Can Union Gas 
sue 
Pennsylvania?
Brennan (4) Yes  (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Rehnquist (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
 Stevens (1) Yes (1) No (1) No  (1)
White  (1) No  (1) Yes (1) Yes   (1)
TOTAL Yes 5-4  Yes 5-4  Yes 5-4 
171 The other two cases were Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); United States v. Vuitch, 
402 U.S. 62 (U.S., 1971). In Fulminante, there were three issues: Was the confession coerced; Did 
the harmless error applies to the admission of a coerced confession;  and Was the admission of the 
confession in this case harmless? Although Justice Kennedy believed the confession was not 
coerced [and thus the conviction should be valid], because a majority found otherwise, he voted to 
reverse the conviction on the ground that its admission was not harmless.499 U.S. at  313-14.   In 
Vuitch, the Court faced two issues: Did the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal by the 
Government; and Was the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague?  Even though Justices 
Harlan and Blackmun believed the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction [and thus the 
Government should lose the case], because a majority found otherwise, they voted that the 
Government should win the case on the ground that statute was not unconstitutionally vague. 402 
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U.S. at 93 ( Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction.); Id. at 97-98 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
There are three excellent articles discussing the vote-switch cases: Stearns,  Should Justices 
Ever Switch Votes, supra note , 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87 (1999); Kornhauser & Sager, The One and 
the Many, supra note , 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1993);  Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note , 79 Ky L J 
439 (1991).
172 There is some question, however, as to how firm the holdings of a vote-switch case really are.  
When overruling the constitutional holding of Union Gas seven years after it was announced, the 
Court declared: “Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies 
underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its 
issuance, been of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly 
disagreed with the rationale of the plurality.”  Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
173 Professor Rogers refers to this as, “individual inconsistency.”Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra 
note ,  79 Ky. L.J. at 473-474.
174 For example, the Court by a 5-4 vote ruled that Congress could not authorize private law suits 
for damages against the State under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 
104 Stat. 330, 42 U.S.C. §§§§ 12111-12117, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356,  ( 2001), but by another 5-4 vote that Congress could authorize private law suits for damages 
against the State under Title II ADA, 104 Stat. 337, 42 U.S.C. §§§§ 12131-12165, Tennessee v. 
Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).  The only vote that changed between the decisions was the “swing 
vote” of Justice O’Connor.
175 Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note , 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 24.
176 Stearns,  Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note , 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. at 149.
177 Professor Rogers states that such vote switching will “undermine respect for the courts” 
Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note , 79 Ky. L.J. at 475.
178 Such “voting against one's own conclusions,” in order to achieve a desired outcome is 
sometimes termed “strategic voting.” Rogers, I Vote This Way , supra note,   79 Ky. L.J. at 468. See 
also. Abramowicz  and Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes, supra note,  54 Vand. L. Rev. at 1932 
[stating that “principled” means “nonstrategic”].
179  Issue voting is different from what Professor Delson has termed “voting by part.”  B. Rudolph 
Delson, Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
1203, 1218 (2001)(hereinafter “Typography in the U.S. Reports”).  Voting by part occurs when a  
Justice joins one part of another Justice's opinion without joining that opinion in its entirety.  By 
contrast issue voting is the protocol under which the Court votes on each issue necessary to resolve 
a case, and then reaches its conclusion based on those votes. Id.
180 Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note ,  80 Geo. L.J. at 744.  They prefer the 
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hyphenated phrases of  "issue-voting" and “outcome-voting”, id. but, for simplicity, I will drop the 
hyphen. See e.g. John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to 
Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996).  Note that some other commentators prefer 
the phrase “issue by issue voting” See e.g., Delson, supra , “Typography in the U.S. Reports,” 76 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 1204.
181 See e.g. Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note ,  81 Cal. L. Rev. at 49 
(stating “ To resolve a controversy issue by issue, the judges must agree on what constitutes an 
issue”). For an excellent discussion of the problems associated with the different ways to state 
relevant issues and subissues, see John M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate 
Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997, 1002 (1996).
182 Nash, “A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm”, supra note , 56 Stan. L. Rev.at 128.
183 This example is derived from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).  Although the voting 
patterns of the actual case differ from those in the hypothetical, the actual Court was badly divided 
on several of these issues, as well as others that were raised in the case.
184 A similar hypothetical was presented by John Rogers. Rogers, Issue Voting, supra note ,  49 
Vand. L. Rev. at 472-73. He imagined a capital case, where four Justices voted that an execution 
was barred by the fifth amendment but not the eighth amendment, while four other justices voted 
that the execution would violate  by the eighth but not the fifth amendment.  Under issue voting, if 
the sole remaining Justice voted that neither provision barred the execution, there would be a 5-4 
majority for finding neither amendment violated.  Thus, if issue-voting were utilized, the defendant 
would be executed, despite the fact that 8 of the 9 Justices believed the execution unconstitutional. 
In the words of Professor Rogers, “This result cannot be right.” Id. at 473.
185 Kornhauser and Sage, The One and the Many, supra note ,81 Calif. L. Rev. at 30.
186 Id., 81 Calif. L. Rev. at 57.    They suggest different factors that appellate courts could use in 
making their metavotes, including inter alia the comparative importance of the issues versus the 
outcome, the avoidance of  path dependence, and whether the case involves the appeal of serious 
criminal convictions. Id., 81 Calif. L. Rev. at 33-41.
187 Nash, A Context-sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, supra note , 56
Stan. L. Rev. at 142.
188 Nash, A Context-sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, supra note , 56 
Stan. L. Rev. at 149-50.
189 Id., 56 Stan. L. Rev. at 148.  Nash also states that issue-voting should be utilized for, 
“arguments that would constitute independent appeals were interlocutory appeals permissible. Each 
of these arguments should be afforded separate votes.” Id., 56 Stan. L. Rev. at 147.
190 Id., 56 Stan. L. Rev. at 150.
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191 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at , 434, n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring)
192 Id., citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
193 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 472 (Breyer, J. dissenting), quoting  United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. at 530.
194 In fact, this question arose in United States v. Virginia, itself.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
majority, stated that she was merely summarizing, “the Court's current directions for cases of 
official classification based on gender”. 518 U.S. at 532.  By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
complained that, by stating that the government must demonstrate an "'exceedingly persuasive 
justification'" to support a gender-based classification....the Court thereby introduces an element of 
uncertainty respecting the appropriate test.”  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, 
C. J., concurring).
195 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
196 Nash, A Context-sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, supra note , 56 
Stan. L. Rev. at 153.
197 Nash’s plan, in fact, would prohibit Justices from breaking the issue into subissues: “The 
proposal directs that pure issues of law not be decomposed.”  56 Stan. L. Rev. at 153. For an 
analysis of the Court’s actual voting pattern in  Apodaca , see Appendix, infra.
198 Nash, A Context-sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, supra note , 56 
Stan. L. Rev. at 153-54.
199 There was also no need for Justices Scalia and Thomas to discuss standing once they decided 
that the Court could not issue the requested remedy.  Even without their input, though, there were 
still have been five votes for standing, and thus the same irrational opinion would have been issued. 
200 William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act 5, scene 4.  It may be that in some circumstances, 
including perhaps Miller, some Justices may believe that it is very importan t that lower courts see 
the number of Justices with a particular viewpoint on a disputed substantive question, such as the 
correct standard for dealing with sex discrimination.  If so, they may simple conclude that the value 
of presenting that viewpoint, even in an irrational opinion, outweighs the confusion created by such 
opinions.
201 Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm, supra note , 56 Stan. L. Rev. at 157-58. 
He similarly suggests that when an intermediate appellate court panel generates an irrational 
opinion, the full court should tend to grant en banc review. Id. 56 Stan. L. Rev. at 157.
202 One should not assume that the rigorous field of chaos theory can be applied directly to fields 
such as law.  Chaos theory is technically defined as “the qualitative study of unstable aperiodic 
behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems.”Stephen H. Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos
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2 (1993).  The formal mathematics necessary to a complete understanding of chaos theory can be 
quite daunting to the non-mathematician. See e.g. Robert L. Devaney, Introduction to Chaotic 
Dynamical Systems  (2nd ed. 1989).  For an accessible telling of  the story of the development of 
chaos theory, see James Gleick, Chaos (1987).  See generally, Michael I. Meyerson, Political 
Numeracy 185-208, Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1091 
(2000), Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: the Web of Law, Management 
Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 137 (1998), Edward S. 
Adams, Gordon B. Brumwell, and  James A. Glazier, At the End of Palsgraf, There Is Chaos: an 
Assessment of Proximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory,,59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 507 (1998), J.B. Ruhl, 
Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-society System: a Wake-up Call for 
Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 Duke L.J. 849 (1996).
203 Robert L. Devaney, Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems 50 (2nd ed. 1989).
204 See John L. Casti, Complexification 89 (1994).
205 Franco Vivaldi, "An Experiment with Mathematics," Exploring Chaos 41 (ed. Nina Hall 
1991).
206 The original paper was published in German: Heisenberg, Werner. "ÜÜber den anschaulichen 
Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik." Z. füür Phys. 43, 172-198, 1927.   An 
English translation of Heisenberg’s discussion of the Uncertainty Principle can be found in 
Heisenberg, Werner, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory. (1930.)( Trans. Carl 
Eckhart and F.C. Hoyt) For an accessible and lawyer-friendly description of the Uncertainty 
Principle, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn 
From Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17-19  (1989). See also Cassidy, David, "Heisenberg, 
Uncertainty and the Quantum Revolution." Scientific American,106-112 (May 1992),.
207 According to Heisenber, once “the electron has been pushed by the light quantum, it has 
changed its momentum and its velocity, and one can show that the uncertainty of this change is just 
big enough to guarantee the validity of the uncertainty relations.” Werner  Heisenberg, Physics and 
Philosophy: the Revolution in Modern Science 47-48 (1958).
208 “According to Heisenberg, the more accurately you measure where a particle is, the less 
accurately you are able to measure where it's going.” Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space, 
supra note, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 17.
209 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: from the Big Bang to Black Holes 29 (1988).
210 See R. George Wright,  Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from 
Quantum Mechanics ,18 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 855, --- (1991) (saying “mathematics or nature itself, 
rather than our physical disturbance of the system, underlies the uncertainties in the simultaneous 
measurement of those variables.”).
211 The formal proof can be found in Kurt Gödel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of 
-124-
Principa Mathematica and Related Systems I , trans. Jean van Heijenoort trans., in S. G. Shanker, 
ed., Gödel's Theorem in Focus 30 (1988). For a non-technical explanation of the Incompleteness 
Theorem. see Meyerson, Political Numeracy, supra note , at 162-66, Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, 
Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid  (1979),  See Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of 
Certainty 258-68 (1980).  See generally Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in 
Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Research, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 51,  118-19 (1996).
212 In greatly simplified terms, Gödel found a way to put into mathematical notation a version of 
the “Liar’s Paradox.” The “Liar’s Paradox.” involves the sentence, “This statement is false.” The 
problem arises because if we deem the statement in quotes to be “false” then it is by definition true. 
However, if we term the statement in quotes “true”, then it becomes false. Thus, the truthfulness or 
falsity of the statement cannot be determined. See Meyerson, Political Numeracy, supra note , at 
164-65.  See also Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Godel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness 
in Social Decision-Making, 79 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 497, 515  (2004).
213 Rudy Rucker, Mind Tools (1987).
214 Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty 316-17 (1980).
215 Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction 
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 75, 123 (1998), quoting Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, 
supra note ,  80 Geo. L.J. at 743.
